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Abstract
Economic development, more often than not, is tightly connected to good governance and
adequate provision of public goods and services. My dissertation examines characteristics
of developing countries that are relevant to the quality of government, as they affect the
interaction between citizens and government. In chapter 1, I focus on squatters and the
opportunities for political intermediation associated with the lack of property rights on
land. In this chapter, I study an extensive land titling program in urban Mexico and its
effect on clientelism. In chapter 2, I examine the costs of party turnover for the quality of
public education in Brazilian municipalities, a context where the bureaucracy is not shielded
from the political process. In chapter 3, I study the feedback effect of government work on
citizens’ participation. To this end, I focus on maintenance work on the public space and
citizens’ complaints in the City of Buenos Aires.
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Introduction
Economic development, more often than not, is tightly connected to good governance and
adequate provision of public goods and services. My dissertation examines characteristics
of developing countries that are relevant to the quality of government, as they affect the
interaction between citizens and government.
Clientelism is a common practice in developing countries, and one that often has
detrimental effects for public good provision and political accountability. In chapter 1, "Can
Clientelistic Ties be Broken? Evidence from an Urban Titling Program in Mexico" (with
Horacio Larreguy and John Marshall), I study the determinants of clientelism by focusing on
a federal land titling program in urban Mexico that reached nearly 2.16 million households
in 35 years. I find that municipal incumbents, who are particularly well positioned to enforce
clientelistic exchanges, are the ones most affected by the distribution of property rights on
land: their vote share significantly decreases after the program was implemented in the area.
At the same time, I also find that incumbent parties that were responsible for the program
are rewarded by voters, especially in federal elections. I thus address an important empirical
challenge in the literature, namely, teasing out the impact of reforms on clientelism from
their direct effect on voters electoral preferences.
While it is expected that parties taking office will bring high level officials to the
government, in developing countries the bureaucracy can also be highly exposed to the
political process. In chapter 2, "Political Turnover, Bureaucratic Turnover, and the Quality of
Public Services" (with Mitra Akhtari and Diana Moreira), I study the effect of party turnover
on the appointment of teachers, appointment of headmasters, and the quality of education
1
provision in Brazil. Using a regression discontinuity design on close mayoral elections, I
find that municipalities with a new party in office have higher turnover of headmasters and
teachers the year after the election: 24 and 10 percentage points more positions are replaced,
respectively. Party turnover also has real and persistent effects on education outcomes. In
municipalities with turnover, test scores are 0.13 standard deviations lower and dropout
rates are 37% higher. The decrease in performance persists three years after the election.
The evidence suggests that the disruption of personnel at the school level is driving the
decrease in students’ performance: headmasters are less experienced in their positions and
teachers’ assessment of the headmaster is more negative, whereas teachers’ characteristics,
students’ characteristics, or resources spent on education do not seem to change. Taken
together, the results suggest that the disruption to the bureaucracy has a real cost for the
quality of service provision.
In chapter 3, "Fixing Broken Windows: The Effect of Government Maintenance Work
on Citizens’ Complaints", I use a unique dataset with detailed information on citizens’
complaints and government maintenance work in the public space in the City of Buenos
Aires to answer the following question: do citizens participate more when the government
works more? Exploiting variation of repairs over time, I estimate the effect of maintenance
work in the public space on complaints filed by citizens. The main finding of this paper is
that government work stimulates participation: when the government repairs problems in
the public space, citizens are more likely to complain about other problems in the area. The
evidence suggests that increased citizen participation reflects a change in underlying beliefs
about government responsiveness rather than just a shift of attention toward problems
in the public space, beliefs about state capacity, poorly executed maintenance work, or
reverse causality. These findings point toward the existence of strategic complementarities
between government actions and citizens’ participation, which could contribute to explain
the substantial variation in the quality of public goods both across and within countries.
2
Chapter 1
Can Clientelistic Ties be Broken?
Evidence from an Urban Titling
Program in Mexico 1
1.1 Introduction
Clientelism, the exchange of personal favors for political support, is ubiquitous in many
developing contexts (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Schaffer 2007). This practice has im-
portant and often detrimental implications for the provision of public goods and political
accountability (Keefer 2007; Keefer and Vlaicu 2008). While a blossoming literature explains
how clientelistic exchanges operate in practice—whether brokers mobilize likely supporters
through turnout buying (Nichter 2008) or induce individuals to change their vote by exploit-
ing their reciprocity (Finan and Schechter 2012; Lawson and Greene 2014), or how parties
provide incentives to brokers to mitigate moral hazard and adverse selection problems
(Larreguy 2013; Larreguy, Marshall and Querubin forthcoming; Stokes et al. 2013)—a lot
less is known about what ultimately leads voters to enter clientelistic relationships and
especially the conditions under which voters escape such relationships.
1Co-authored with Horacio Larreguy and John Marshall
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Why might voters enter and remain in clientelistic interactions? One possibility is that
the short-term return to voters from engaging in clientelistic exchanges is larger than the
benefits associated with public goods. Since clients often live in poverty, the marginal return
of immediate informal assistance from brokers may often exceed future benefits of public
good provision (Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez and Magaloni forthcoming; Magaloni 2006). Even
without relying on high discount rates, the ongoing distributional benefits of clientelism—
made possible by lasting ties to the community that supply privileged information about
individual needs—could be higher than even programmatic policies in the long-run for the
subset of the population receiving such benefits (Lizzeri and Persico 2001). Alternatively,
voters may be unaware of programmatic policies, and even if they are aware of such policies,
promises of programmatic policies may not be regarded as credible. Many developing
democracies struggle to escape equilibria where politicians that (potentially) would like
to provide programmatic policies cannot commit to such provision because short-term
electoral incentives lead them to break their promises in order to retain office (Keefer 2007;
Keefer and Vlaicu 2008).
Understanding why voters fall into and remain in clientelistic exchanges faces major
empirical challenges. In particular, the impact of any reform that may alter the marginal
return of clientelistic transactions to voters or provide information about alternative political
agendas like programmatic politics might also independently affect a voter’s electoral behav-
ior by altering their appraisal of the government implementing the reform. This difficulty is
exemplified in the growing literature exploiting natural experiments to identify the effects
of conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs). These programs, which spread across Latin
America in the late 1990s and early 2000s, reduce the benefits of clientelistic transfers for
voters while increasing the returns from public goods by transparently conditioning cash
transfers on school attendance and regular medical checks. De La O (2013) and Diaz-Cayeros,
Estévez and Magaloni (forthcoming) in Mexico, Manacorda, Miguel and Vigorito (2011) in
Uruguay, and Zucco (2013) in Brazil all find that enrollment in CCTs substantially increases
electoral support for the incumbent party. These findings could be taken as evidence that
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CCTs are unable to undermine the conditions under which clientelistic exchanges can
operate effectively. However, such a conclusion ignores the possibility that CCTs might only
increase incumbent support through shorter-run mechanisms. For example, Manacorda,
Miguel and Vigorito (2011) correctly note that their results are equally consistent with
poorly-informed voters using policy to infer information about politicians.
In this paper we separate the effects of a major land titling program on clientelism and
reward for policy implementation. Since 1973, the Mexican government has created property
rights on communal lands and offered squatters the opportunity to buy those rights at
highly subsidized prices. Over 35 years, the program has reached 2.16 million households.
Like CCT programs, recipients of land titles experience increased access to public goods
and a positive net wealth effect.2
There is a strong symbiotic relationship between the lack of property rights and clien-
telism in urban Mexico. Political brokers and government officials often offer squatters
protection against eviction in exchange for political support. In addition, their inability to
provide proof of residence creates a host of other opportunities for political intermediation.
Consequently, the establishment of land property rights has the potential to substantially
diminish the dependency of squatters upon the incumbent political parties, and thus break
down clientelistic ties. However, identifying the effect of land titling on clientelism is
vulnerable to the same empirical concerns as CCTs. If incumbent parties, especially at the
federal level, are credited for the program’s implementation, then land titling reforms may
also increase political support for the incumbent among the reform’s beneficiaries.
Leveraging the timing of land titling of informal urban settlements owned by ejidos
and agrarian communities, we use a difference-in-differences design to identify the effect
of land titling on the vote share of municipal incumbents.3 In order to avoid comparing
2Although the short-run wealth effect is negative due to the purchase, the cost was low, and access to
subsidies were facilitated. Squatters can avoid the cost altogether by choosing not to enter the program, but
rarely do so.
3Ejidos consist of lands that were granted to communities of petitioners that never had land after the
Mexican revolution. Agrarian communities instead represent the restitution of lands that were expropriated
from communities of peasants during the rule of Porfirio Díaz between 1876 and 1910. Both ejidos and agrarian
5
locations containing squatters to those that never experienced squatters, we focus solely on
electoral precincts that experienced land titling at least once as part of the CORETT (Comité
para la Regularización de la Tenencia de la Tierra) program between 1980 and 2013.4 Since
the rewards from implementing the program accrue to the party executing the titling, but
the ability of local politicians to engage in clientelistic practices is reduced for all future
incumbents, by examining the vote share of different incumbent parties across different
levels of government over time we are able to disentangle rewards for the party executing
the titling from changes in the clientelistic relationship between local incumbent parties and
voters.
We focus on electoral results at the precinct level—the smallest geographical electoral
unit for which voting data is available—and operationalize our treatment in two ways.
First, we identify the overall effect of the introduction of the titling program in the precinct
across all future elections. Second, we exploit the fact that the program was implemented
over several years in almost half of precincts and look at the change in titling intensity
within a given precinct. We measure the effect on clientelism by looking at the vote share
of municipal incumbents, since municipal incumbents are in a particularly good position
to exploit the dependency of squatters upon the government. In particular, municipality
governments can provide the basic infrastructure that irregular settlements lack and can
condition protection from eviction and access to public good on their electoral success.
We find that land titling permanently decreases political support for municipal incum-
bents. The average land titling event in our sample decreases the vote share of municipal
incumbents by 2.2 percentage points (or 5% of their vote tally). To alleviate the concern that
these findings might be driven by differential trends in incumbent party support in areas
where the titling took place, we demonstrate the validity of the identifying parallel trends
assumption. First, neither changes in incumbent vote share nor changes in turnout over
communities were initially granted as communal lands. However, the Programa de Certificación de Derechos
Ejidales y Titulación de Solares (PROCEDE) that started in 1992 has allocated individual land certificates since.
4We restrict our sample to precincts for which at least 10% of their population is part of the ejido or agrarian
community that was affecting by titling by the CORETT. Our results are robust to stricter sample restrictions.
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time predict the occurrence of land titling. Second, the inclusion of up to third-order lags
of the corresponding treatment variable never significantly predicts electoral performance.
Third, the results are robust to including state-, municipality-, and ejido-specific time trends.
We supplement these findings with further evidence consistent with a break down in
clientelism driving our baseline result. First, the electoral prospects of state and federal
incumbents, who are less likely to rely on weak property rights for the enforcement of their
clientelistic exchanges, are not significantly harmed by the land titling program. Second,
the prevalence of other sources of clientelism (in particular, government employment)
ameliorates the negative impact of the land titling program on the electoral support of
municipal incumbents.
However, we also rule out a series of alternative interpretations of our results. Exam-
ining the ideological leanings of municipal incumbents, we show that our findings are
not explained by a shift in preferences toward more market-oriented parties (de Janvry,
Gonzalez-Navarro and Sadoulet 2014). This result suggests that the findings are unlikely to
be explained by a switch in political preference due to greater economic prospects (Di Tella,
Galiani and Schargrodsky 2007), better labor market opportunities (de Janvry et al. forth-
coming; Field 2007), or enhanced credit and investment opportunities (Field and Torero 2008;
Field 2005) that could be associated with the program for its beneficiaries. We then show
that the alignment of the municipal government with higher levels of government does
not protect municipal incumbents from the negative electoral effect of the titling program.
Given that such alignment increases the capacity of municipal governments to provide
public goods, this result indicates that our findings are unlikely to reflect a lack of resources
for municipal incumbents to deliver the public goods that they are obliged to provide after
the allocation of property rights.
Finally, we find that voters indeed reward municipal and federal incumbents for the
implementation of the program when the party in power is responsible for its implementa-
tion at the federal level. For such parties, these rewards offset the cost of breaking down
clientelism at the municipal level, and entail a net gain at the federal level. We are thus able
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to address a key empirical challenge in the literature, namely, differentiating the impact
of a program on clientelism from its impact on voter appraisal of the incumbent’s policy
performance. Moreover, our findings help explain the puzzle of why incumbent parties
implement programs and reforms that might hurt their ability to engage in clientelistic
exchanges (de Janvry, Gonzalez-Navarro and Sadoulet 2014). As in the case of Mexico’s
CCT program, Progresa, in the late 1990s, our results suggest that a historically clientelistic
government may transition toward programmatic programs in an attempt to hold onto
power at the federal level.
These findings contribute to various literatures. First, our paper is naturally related to
the literature that looks at the institutional changes that led to the demise of clientelism
in the developed world. Stokes et al. (2013) study the collapse of machine politics in the
United Kingdom and the United States. Related, Folke, Hirano and Snyder (2011a) and
Ujhelyi (2014a,b) show how civil service reforms short-handed the ability of clientelistic
parties to use government employment and resources to reward voters. We instead focus on
a major developing context where clientelistic exchanges remain prevalent, and thus show
how policy reforms can break down such ties in a contemporary setting.
We also reinterpret recent work highlighting the significant effect of programmatic
policies on incumbent support (De La O 2013; Manacorda, Miguel and Vigorito 2011; Zucco
2013). De La O (2013) and Manacorda, Miguel and Vigorito (2011) document a short-run
electoral effect, and argue that such an effect is consistent with voters updating about the
incumbent’s ability or willingness to deliver programmatic policies. Zucco (2013) further
argues that the effect is short-lived and that programmatic policies are unlikely to induce
substantial long-term realignment of voter. Our distinctive empirical strategy instead shows
that incumbents implementing programmatic policies enjoy an electoral reward in both the
short and the long run, but also provides evidence that the ability to engage in clientelistic
exchanges is severely curtailed for future incumbents. Moreover, our analysis illuminates
the relative impact of these opposing effects on the electoral performance of the incumbents
implementing programmatic policies. In particular, we show that performance varies by
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level of government: in the program that we study, while municipal incumbents that are
more dependent on weak property rights for the enforcement of their clientelistic exchanges
suffer from the breakdown of clientelism, higher levels of governments enjoy the electoral
rewards of constituents pleased with the switch toward programmatic policies.
Lastly, our work is closely related to Castañeda Dower and Pfutze (2015) and de Janvry,
Gonzalez-Navarro and Sadoulet (2014), who look at the effect of an agricultural land
certification program on electoral behavior in Mexico. While both papers examine the
same CORETT program, they focus on two different outcome variables—the vote share of
the centrist National Action Party (PAN) and the clientelistic Institutional Revolutionary
Party (PRI), respectively—and reach two different conclusions. While de Janvry, Gonzalez-
Navarro and Sadoulet (2014) argue that the wealth effect induced by the program led to a
shift in votes towards the right,5 Castañeda Dower and Pfutze (2015) argue the program
broke down clientelistic transactions. By focusing on the vote share of municipal and federal
incumbent parties, and looking at heterogeneous effect by their ideological position, we
are able to arbitrate between the arguments proposed by de Janvry, Gonzalez-Navarro and
Sadoulet (2014) and Castañeda Dower and Pfutze (2015). In contrast to these studies, we are
able to isolate the effect of property rights on clientelistic ties from the rewards associated
with implementing the program.
The next section describes the use of clientelism in Mexico, its relationship to the lack
of property rights, and the CORETT land titling program. Section 1.3 describes the data
used in the analysis and our empirical strategy. Section 1.4 reports the results identifying
the impact of the program on clientelism and rewards for the incumbent party as well as
the robustness checks that we perform. Section 1.5 concludes.
5These findings are also consistent with a breakdown of clientelistic transactions, since incumbents and
more clientelistic parties in Mexico are located disproportional at the left and center.
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1.2 Background
We focus on informal settlements located on urban land belonging to an ejido or agrarian
community in Mexico that participated in the the CORETT land titling program. These
settlements are distributed across 463 municipalities (19% of all municipalities in Mexico)
from all 31 Mexican states excluding the Federal District (Table 1.1).6
The PRI is the most common municipal incumbent in our panel (60% of precinct-
elections), followed by PAN (26%), and then the Party of the Democratic Revolution or
PRD (13%). The distribution of municipal incumbents resembles the distribution across
all municipalities over the period, as shown in Table 1.2. Even though these areas are
particularly vulnerable to clientelism, they have also experienced significant land titling
reforms that could break those clientelistic ties but also generate electoral rewards for the
incumbent.
1.2.1 Clientelism in urban settlements without property rights
There is a strong symbiotic relationship between clientelism and the lack of property
rights in urban Mexico. First, the illegal occupation of urban land has historically been
supported largely by politicians or brokers in order to establish and secure a captured
base of clients.7 Considerable evidence from focus groups we conducted and the press
demonstrates that either politicians or brokers with political connections in the government
have encouraged individuals to illegally take possession of land or illegally purchase land
while offering protection against government intervention.8 In return for their protection,
6We exclude the Federal District from our sample since there are no municipal governments in it, and
the analogous local governing bodies have responsibilities that differ greatly from those of the municipal
governments.
7This situation is not unique to Mexico. For example, Fox (2014) and Hansungule, Feeney and Palmer (1998)
provide evidence of similar situations in Sub-Saharan Africa, while Clichevsky (2003) offers similar accounts
from the Greater Buenos Aires in Argentina.
8For evidence from the press, see “Grandes asentamientos,” El Universal, July 19th 2000; “Habitan familias
en riesgo total,” El Sol de Puebla, July 23rd 2009; “Vecinos trabajando,” El Universal, May 19th 2013. Participants
in focus groups conducted in former squatter communities that benefited from titling by the CORETT often
reported that the occupation of their lands was mediated by intermediaries with connections with the municipal
10
Table 1.1: Distribution of Municipalities in our Sample
Full Sample Our sample
State Number of municipalities Number of municipalities % over total
Aguascalientes 11 7 63.6%
Baja California 5 4 80.0%
Baja California Sur 5 2 40.0%
Campeche 11 5 45.5%
Chiapas 118 19 16.1%
Chihuahua 67 16 23.9%
Coahuila 38 13 34.2%
Colima 10 7 70.0%
Durango 39 14 35.9%
Guanajuato 46 21 45.7%
Guerrero 81 19 23.5%
Hidalgo 84 20 23.8%
Jalisco 125 35 28.0%
México 125 29 23.2%
Michoacán 113 34 30.1%
Morelos 33 19 57.6%
Nayarit 20 7 35.0%
Nuevo León 51 6 11.8%
Oaxaca 570 11 1.9%
Puebla 217 18 8.3%
Querétaro 18 10 55.6%
Quintana Roo 10 5 50.0%
San Luis Potosí 58 12 20.7%
Sinaloa 18 15 83.3%
Sonora 72 14 19.4%
Tabasco 17 5 29.4%
Tamaulipas 43 11 25.6%
Tlaxcala 60 5 8.3%
Veracruz 212 58 27.4%
Yucatán 106 13 12.3%
Zacatecas 58 9 15.5%
Total 2441 463 19.0%
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Table 1.2: Distribution of Municipal Incumbents in our Sample, by Party
Municipal All Our sample
incumbent Municipalities · years Municipalities · years
Number % Number %
PRI 190,957 56.1% 13,308 57.97%
PAN 101,994 29.9% 6,030 26.27%
PRD 38,928 11.4% 2,947 12.84%
Other 8,774 2.6% 673 2.93%
brokers sometimes charge minor fees.9 However, the main political motive for encouraging
squatting is to condition the permanence of squatters on their political support (Díaz
2008; Flores Rodríguez 2008).10 While in some cases there are direct threats of eviction by
incumbent politicians and brokers, in other cases squatters are indirectly threatened with
the possibility of eviction if another party comes to power (Flores Rodríguez 2008).
Second, regardless of whether party officials or brokers offer protection or threaten
eviction in exchange for political support, the possibility of a legal land title is an important
political asset. Incumbent politicians and brokers often stress the importance of their
continuity in power for titling to occur (Flores Rodríguez 2008). Some parties have gone
even further by issuing certificates of possession free of charge to residents of several illegal
settlements. Since these certificates were issued by specific political parties, squatters feared
that they would be evicted if there was a change in power (see Holzner 2004 for an example
from a PRI municipality). It is also common that incumbent officials explicitly condition
titling opportunities on electoral support, in some cases requesting the formal affiliation of
government, who later continued to intermediate between them and the government.
9See “Grandes asentamientos,” El Universal, July 19th 2000.
10Díaz (2008) also argues that often the lack of political support for the regularization of property rights
originates from the fact that politicians did not want to lose the control over the voters in irregular settlements.
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community members to the party (Varley 1994).11
Third, the illegal use of land in irregular urban settlements, together with the initial
lack of provision of basic public services in such settlements, creates other opportunities
for political intermediation (Vite Pérez 2001).12 Since the municipal government is not
obliged to—and probably should not—provide public services when land is occupied
illegally, squatters become easy prey for political clientelism (Garcés Fierros 2009).13 There
are several accounts of public officials justifying the lack of public service provision in
irregular settlements due to the lack of property rights (Varley 1994).14 Moreover, the
inability to provide formal proof of residence has prevented squatters from accessing social
programs (Varley 1994).15 The inability of squatters to legally demand that the government
provide them with public services and social programs creates opportunities for political
manipulation. Their precarious conditions make squatters highly dependent upon the
government for social and unemployment plans and housing, which they cannot legally
request because of their illegal residency (Villalón 2003). This weak position is often
exploited by local politicians and political brokers who assist squatters with their demands
in exchange for their votes in elections.16
Political intermediation takes many forms. In some cases leaders of irregular settlements
are co-opted by incumbent parties, such that settlements are required to affiliate with the
party in order to gain access to government benefits both for themselves and their commu-
nities (Holzner 2004). In other cases, the government promotes the creation of community
11See “Solapa Gudiño asentamientos irregulares: PAN,” Imagen del Golfo, May 8th 2013.
12This is not unique to Mexico. Gay (1990, 1994), Burgwald (1996), Auerbach (Forthcoming) and Kuehl (2013)
provide evidence that party officials intervene to direct public services to people in slums in Brazil, Ecuador,
India and Peru respectively.
13See “Vecinos trabajando,” El Universal, May 19th 2013; “Piden reubicar a dos millones; familias viven en
500 mil casas de alto riesgo,” Excelsior, September 30th 2013.
14Varley (1994) mentions the interesting case of a public official that stated that they would not provide
public services in no man’s land.
15See “En la capital hay 8 mil familias en extrema pobreza,” La Jornada Aguascalientes, August 2nd 2013.
16This situation is well characterized by Shami and Majid (2014) in the case of Pakistan.
13
associations, or exploits exiting ones by staffing their committees with individuals with close
ties to the incumbent party or by directly appointing incumbent party officials (Trujeque
Díaz 1997; Vite Pérez 2001). In the absence of community association leaders, intermediation
is often undertaken by traditional brokers and party officials.
Regardless of whether it is because of a threat of eviction, protection, promise of land,
or in exchange of public services, there is abundant evidence that people in irregular
urban settlements are disproportionally subjected to political mobilization and illegal
electoral practices (Holzner 2004). There is extensive evidence of squatters being mobilized
to attend political rallies—often without knowing who and they are mobilizing for.17
Importantly, individuals living in such settlements are also subject to significant turnout
buying. Although acarreo, which involves transporting voters to polling stations, is illegal
under Article 403 of the Mexican Federal Penal Code (Larreguy, Marshall and Querubin
forthcoming), there are abundant newspaper accounts documenting its extensive use in
irregular settlements by hired coaches and especially groups of taxi drivers.18
Combined, this evidence suggests that the establishment of formal property rights could
substantially break down clientelistic interactions facilitated by the existence of illegal urban
settlements that generate a key dependence of voters on local politicians. Some accounts
suggest that the titling provided by the CORETT ended the historical clientelistic business
of parties.19
1.2.2 CORETT and credit claiming
Due to the large number of irregular settlements spread out over social property (i.e. ejidos
and agrarian communities), the administration of Luis Echeverría (1970-1976) decided to
17See “Vecinos trabajando,” El Universal, May 19th 2013; “Se manifiestan vecinos de Los Volcanes en Cabildo
contra comerciantes y concejal,” Sistema Radiofónico Informativo, October 8th 2014.
18See “Cerraron gasolinerías en Cancún para evitar acarreos,” Cronica, July 7th 2005; “Sustitutos de última
hora en colonias irregulares,” Por Esto Quintana Roo, no date.
19See “La situación política económica y social del estado de Baja California Norte vista desde abajo y hacia
la izquierda,” Rincón Rupestre, October 5th 2006.
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create the Committee for the Regularization of Land Ownership (Comité para la Regular-
ización de la Tenencia de la Tierra, CORETT) in 1973, which had limited reach and resources.
Its purpose was to regularize the informal settlements located both in federal and social
property. The following year the Committee was advanced to the rank of Commission and
endowed with more resources and the power to expropriate land for subsequent tiling.
Since 1979, the Commission has restricted its work to the regularization of social land in
urban areas (Varley 1994; Díaz 2008; Flores Rodríguez 2008).
Since its conception, the CORETT has played a major role in the regularization of urban
land in Mexico. By 2008, in its 35th anniversary, the CORETT had benefited 2.16 million
households across Mexico. It is is estimated that 8.64 million individuals, 11.5% of the
Mexican urban population, benefited from the scheme. In 35 years of work, the CORETT
contributed to the titling of around 150 thousand hectares, which accounts for approximately
10% of urban land in Mexico (Carreras López 2008).
The program operates as follows. The CORETT first identifies an urban settlement
located on land belonging to an ejido or agrarian community. The land is then expropriated
from the ejido or community members formally owning the land in exchange for economic
compensation reflecting the commercial value of the land. Once the CORETT takes pos-
session of the land, it conducts a census of the squatters and the plots they occupy. This
information then informs the (highly-subsidized) price set for squatters to acquire formal
property rights over the land they occupied. Moreover, squatters are informed about the
social programs that they can potentially have access to if they purchase the land. While
the CORETT does not supply these social programs itself, it can channel the potential
beneficiaries to the relevant institutions that provide these.20 Lastly, the squatters have to
formally request that their land be regularized, provide evidence that they indeed occupy
their land, and make the necessary payments (Carreras López 2008; SEDESOL 2011).
20For example, since 2008 the Secretariat of Social Development (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social, SEDESOL)
provides support to the squatters who are in extreme poverty through the Program to Support Settlers in
Situations of Poverty to Regularize Irregular Human Settlements (Programa de Apoyo a los Avecindados en
Condiciones de Pobreza Patrimonial para Regularizar Asentamientos Humanos Irregulares, PASPRAH).
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We are currently in the process of acquiring a better understanding of the determinants
of the choice of squatter settlements overtime. The rules governing the operation of the
CORETT limit the scope for discretion in the titling of land across squatter settlements. The
results in Table 1.3 also indicate that it is not the case that specific parties were more likely
to engage in land titling over time within the precincts in our sample. Moreover, as we
show later, Table 1.5 in Section 1.4 indicates that past performance of municipal and federal
incumbent, as well as turnout behavior, are not associated with land titling.
The rules governing the operation of the CORETT program limit the scope for discretion
in the titling of land within squatter settlements, and consequently for clientelism. However,
CORETT officials make sure that all levels of government that are aligned with the party
controlling the federal government receive credit for titling events. Several accounts present
state governors, and even sometimes the president, delivering property rights themselves.
In many cases, these efforts to enable such politicians to present the transfer of right has
significantly delayed the granting of property right certificates (Varley 1994). In the absence
of the president or state governor, the CORETT public officials in charge of distributing
property rights repeatedly mention how instrumental the state governor and president were
for the titling, as well as the sensitivity of these politicians toward the needs of poorer voters
and their willingness to engage in the efforts required to help those in greatest need.21
Moreover, it is often emphasized that access to formal property rights over their land will
permit access to low-cost credit and social programs, which will contribute to the well-being
of the beneficiaries.22
21See "Entregan Herrera Caldera y Corett títulos de propiedad a 110 familias," La Prensa, November 6th
2013; "Ramírez Marín entrega más de 5 mil títulos de propiedad en Jalisco," Secretaría de Desarrollo Agrario,
Territorial y Urbano, February 25th 2014.
22See "Ramírez Marín entrega más de 5 mil títulos de propiedad en Jalisco," Secretaría de Desarrollo Agrario,
Territorial y Urbano, February 25th 2014.
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1.3 Data and empirical strategy
1.3.1 Data
Through several freedom of information requests, we obtained data from the CORETT on all
the land owned by ejidos and agrarian communities where each CORETT titling occurred,
the date when titling events started, and the number of households that benefited in each
case. We matched this to the Padrón e Historial de Núcleos Agrarios (PHINA) of the Registro
Agrario Nacional (RAN), which contains all the ejido and agrarian communities that were
expropriated by the CORETT, including their unique RAN identifiers. For each ejido and
agrarian community, we identified its geographical location using the spatial database of
the Programa de Certificación de Derechos Ejidales y Titulación de Solares (PROCEDE). To locate
beneficiaries, we use data on the spatial location of rural localities and urban blocks, together
with the population in each, from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI).
Finally, to link this to electoral units, we intersected this with the location of Mexico’s 67,000
electoral precincts using spatial data from the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE).23
We first retrieved the following variables from the CORETT data on the ejidos and
agrarian communities: where each CORETT titling event took place, the date when those
events started, as well the number of households that benefited in each case. To identify
the spatial location of the beneficiaries of each titling, we used two data sources. First, we
took from the Padrón e Historial de Núcleos Agrarios (PHINA) of the Registro Agrario Nacional
(RAN), which contains all the ejido and agrarian communities that were expropriated by
the CORETT, and the unique RAN identifiers for each of these.24 Second, using the unique
RAN identifiers for each ejido and agrarian community, we identified their geographical
location in the spatial database of the Programa de Certificación de Derechos Ejidales y Titulación
de Solares (PROCEDE).
To determine the share of voters in each precinct that benefited in each case of CORETT
23The IFE has since become the Instituto Nacional Electoral.
24The data was scrapped from http://phina.ran.gob.mx/phina2/ by Melissa Dell, who generously shared it
with us.
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titling, we exploited two spatial databases. First, we used data on the spatial location of
rural localities and urban blocks, together with the population in each, from the Instituto
Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI). Second, we combined this with data on the spatial
location of the Mexican precincts from the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE). We first intersected
these two spatial databases to assign each rural locality and urban block to a precinct.25
We then assigned each rural locality and urban block to an ejido or agrarian community.
Using these two assignments, we distributed the number of households that benefited in
each CORETT titling event across the precincts following population shares of each ejido
and agrarian community across the precincts they overlap with. Lastly, assuming that every
household that benefited in each CORETT titling had two registered voters, we computed
the share of voters in each precinct that benefited from each CORETT titling.
We use electoral returns from the IFE and State Electoral Institutes for every available
precinct in each municipal and presidential elections between 1994 and 2013.26 We focus on
precincts that were reached by the land titling program, which leaves us with 4,277 unique
precincts. Figure 1.1 shows the length of our panel on municipal elections for the precincts
in our sample.
There is extensive variation in the timing of the land titling implementation, as depicted
in Figure 1.2.
Moreover, there are two sources of variation in treatment intensity. First, ejidos (or
agrarian communities) and precincts do not fully coincide. An ejido can cover parts of
several precincts, and precincts can intersect more than one ejido, which generates variation
in the exposure—the proportion of voters affected—of each precinct to the titling program.
Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of surface area that is covered by ejidos that were subject to
land titling at some point. Second, precincts vary in the number of times that they received
25At the end of this procedure we only keep precincts where at least 10% of their population is part of the
ejido or agrarian community that was effected by titling by the CORETT. Our results are robust to stricter
sample restrictions.
26For federal elections, we use data from the 1994, 2000, 2006, and 2012 presidential elections. Municipal and
state-level elections are often not held concurrently.
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Figure 1.1: Length of Panel for Precincts in our Sample
titles. Figure 1.4 shows that in almost half of the precincts, the program was implemented
over several (far from consecutive) years.
1.3.2 Empirical Strategy
Municipal incumbents are in a particularly good position to exploit the dependency of
squatters upon the government, as they have the closest connections with the community,
provide the public goods to squatters lack the most, and can condition the permanence
of the squatter in the lands they occupy and public good access on their electoral success.
Accordingly, we assess the effect of property rights on clientelism by looking at changes in
the vote share of municipal incumbent parties after the land titling program is implemented
by the CORETT. Since our regressions do not track one particular party but hold for
municipal incumbents regardless of their affiliation, our estimates are designed not to
capture a shift in voters’ political preferences over parties, but a change in the clientelistic
relationship between incumbent parties and voters.
20
Figure 1.2: Distribution of Land Titling over Time
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Figure 1.3: Share of Precinct Land Affected by Land Titling
Notes: To minimize measurement error in the spatial assignment of precincts to ejidos, we censor our sample at
10% of the share of precinct land that intersects with an ejido affected by land titling.
22
Figure 1.4: Number of Times Land Titles Were Distributed in a Precinct
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We use a difference-in-differences design to identify the effect of the land titling program.
In particular, we exploit within-precinct variation in the exposure to the program to measure
its impact on the municipal incumbent’s vote share. This allows us to circumvent potential
concerns about the correlation between unobservable but fixed characteristics of the precincts
and the allocation of the program.
We use two measures of land titling. First, we consider whether the program had already
reached the precinct by the time of an election. To take into account the fact that the program
had different intensity in different precincts, our variable takes value 0 before the start
of the program, and the average share of voters that had received a title by election time,
where the average is calculated over all post-program elections in our panel for that precinct.
Importantly, this variable does not change if a precinct experiences a second round of land
titling. We thus estimate the following regression using our measure of existing program
intensity, Dpt:
Ypt = bDpt + dt + hp + #pt, (1.1)
where Ypt is the outcome of interest in precinct p at election year t, dt are election year fixed
effects, and hp are precinct fixed effects. The election year fixed effects control for common
trends in our outcomes of interest. Throughout, we cluster errors by municipality.
Our second measure of land titling captures the effect of an increase in the intensity
of the program over time in a given precinct. In almost half of the precincts, the program
was implemented over several (not necessarily consecutive) years. We use the following
specification to measure the impact of an additional increment in the share of voters that
receive a title:
Ypt = bSpt + gSpt 1 + dt + hp + #pt, (1.2)
where Spt is the share of voters that had received a title before election year t in precinct p.
Equation (2) allows us to exploit significantly more variation in the treatment as the roll out
of the land titling program started before our panel for municipal elections and only 9.5%
24
of the precinct-year observations are not affected by the program in our data.
Our design relies on the assumption that the timing of land titlings is not correlated
with changes in incumbent electoral support for any other reason than the treatment of
interest. The main threat to our identification assumption is the strategic allocation of
the program to areas where the outcome is trending in a particular direction. We start
addressing the validity of our empirical strategy by showing no association between the
program allocation and recent changes in incumbent electoral support. To further test
our identifying assumption, we then test for the significance of up to three lags of the
corresponding treatment variables. Through our different specifications we also show the
robustness of our results to the inclusion of state-, municipality-, and ejido-specific time
trends.
Programs or reforms that affect the return of engaging in clientelistic transactions might
also have direct effects on voters’ electoral behavior. This makes it difficult to isolate its
impact on clientelism. The land titling program provides an ideal setting to separate the
two effects because rewards (or punishments) are likely to be targeted towards the specific
incumbent party executing the titling, but the ability to engage in clientelistic practices is
affected for all future local incumbents.
For each election and each precinct, we compute IncTitlingpt as the share of years when
the program was executed that the current municipal incumbent party was the federal
incumbent at the time. As noted above, the federal government is responsible for the
program. We thus separate the such credit claiming effects from the effects working through
the potential breakdown of clientelistic ties using the following specifications:
Ypt = aDpt + bIncTitlingpt + g
⇣
Dpt ⇥ IncTitlingpt
⌘
+ dt + hp + #pt, (1.3)
Ypt = aSpt + bIncTitlingpt + g
⇣
Spt ⇥ IncTitlingpt
⌘
+ dSpt 1 + k IncTitlingpt 1
+r
⇣
Spt 1 ⇥ IncTitlingpt 1
⌘
+ dt + hp + #pt, (1.4)
where the coefficients on Dpt ⇥ IncTitlingpt in equation (3) and on Spt ⇥ IncTitlingpt in
equation (4) capture the rewards or punishment incurred by the municipal incumbent due
25
to previous titling in the precinct. To further assess the credit claiming channel, we use the
same approach to examine how titling differentially affects the federal incumbent’s vote
share in federal elections when it presided over past land titling.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Clientelism breakdown and robustness checks
As argued above, the benefits from clientelistic practices whose enforcement rely on weak
property rights mostly accrue to municipal incumbents. Consequently, any change in the
underlying costs and benefits of clientelism should be mostly reflected in the vote share
of municipal incumbents in municipal elections. Table 1.4 assesses this claim, reporting
the effect of land titling on the vote share of the municipal incumbent party in municipal
elections. Column (1), which corresponds to equation (1), shows the effect of first exposure
to the program, taking into account the overall reach of the program in the precinct. For a
precinct with average initial exposure to the program, the land titling program decreases
municipal incumbent’s vote share by 2.2 percentage points.27 That is, in a precinct with
average exposure to the program at election time, we expect an average decrease of 2.2
percentage points in the vote share of future municipal incumbents. This represents
approximately a 5% decrease in the vote share for the average municipal incumbent.
Columns (2), (3), and (4) consecutively demonstrate the robustness of this result to the
inclusion of trends at the state, municipality, and ejido levels respectively. The negative
effect remains significant despite the loss of precision, and statistically indistinguishable
from the estimate in column (1).
Column (5), which corresponds to equation (2), reports the results of an increase in
the intensity of the program over time. The results show that an average increase in land
titling intensity leads to an additional 0.93 percentage points loss of vote share for municipal
27The average stock of voters exposed across municipalities is 20.5%. We calculate the effect of the program
as 0.205* ⇥ (-0.1077) = -0.022.
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incumbents, or 2.13% of their votes.28 Columns (6), (7), and (8) similarly find no significant
changes in this result once state, municipality, or ejido trends are considered. In sum, and
consistent with breaking down clientelistic ties, we find that the establishment of property
rights on land substantially decreases the electoral support of future municipal incumbents.
Rather than break down clientelistic ties, a potential concern is that the decrease in the
municipal incumbent’s vote share could simply reflect strategic allocation of the CORETT
program to areas where support for the municipal incumbent is declining. If this were
the case, our identifying parallel trends assumption would be violated. To address this
concern, we first test whether electoral trends at the precinct level predict the allocation of
the program by running the following specification:
Npt,t+1 = bCpt + dt + hp + #pt (1.5)
where Cpt is a measure of electoral trends between the previous election at time t  1 and the
election at t in precinct p, and Npt,t+1 is a measure of land titling allocations in precinct p for
the subsequent period (t, t+ 1]. We employ three measures of to capture electoral pre-trends:
first, we use the change in the municipal vote share to check whether the program responds
to municipal interests; second, we examine the change in the municipal turnout rate to test
whether titling aims to (re) mobilize to voters; and third, we also look at the change in the
federal vote share obtained by the federal incumbent at t, to check whether the program
responds to federal interests. We check the predictive power of those electoral changes
for two different measures of program allocation: an indicator that captures whether land
titles were distributed at all between t and t+ 1, and the share of voters that received a title
between t and t+ 1.
Table 1.5 presents the results. Each cell corresponds to one combination of our measures
of electoral pre-trends and program allocation. None of the electoral trends significantly
predicts the allocation of the program, lending support to our identifying assumption.
28The average increase in the share of voters treated by the program is 14.3 percentage points. The effect of
the program is calculated as 0.143 ⇥ (-0.0654) = -0.093.
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These results also challenge the hypothesis that the federal or municipal governments are
promising (and delivering) future land titles in exchange for current support from voters.
To further validate our design, we test for the existence of differential trends by including
lags of our treatment variables. Significant lags would suggest differential trends across
precincts that vary in the number of voters receiving land titles. Tables 1.6 and 1.7 report
the results of specifications including one, two and three lags. Across all specifications,
the coefficient on the lags are generally small and statistically insignificant. This lends
additional support to our empirical strategy. Moreover, the coefficients on the effect of
the titling program on municipal incumbent’s voter share remain stable and statistically
indistinguishable from those obtained in our baseline estimations.
Together, the results in Tables 1.5-1.7, in conjunction with the robustness of our baselines
estimates in Table 1.4 to the inclusion of state-, municipality- and ejido-level trends, suggest
that our estimates are unlikely to be driven by differential trends.
1.4.2 Evidence of clientelism breakdown
While the robust results in Table 1.4 are indicative that land titling in irregular urban
settlements led to a breakdown in clientelistic exchanges between municipal incumbents and
voters, we provide further supporting evidence to cement this link. First, as suggested above,
since municipal governments are more likely to benefit from clientelistic practices whose
enforcement relies on weak property rights, such incumbents should disproportionately
suffer from land titling relatively to federal and state incumbents. To test this, we replicate
our estimates from Table 1.4 instead considering as an outcome the municipal vote share of
the state governor and federal incumbents, as well as the federal vote share of the federal
incumbent.
Tables 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10 respectively present the effect of the land titling program for state
and federal incumbents in municipal elections, and for federal incumbent in federal elections.
They suggest that the allocation of property rights by the CORETT program reduces support
for state and federal incumbents in municipal and federal elections, although the effect is
29
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Table 1.6: Robustness Check: Effect on Vote Share of Municipal Incumbent in Municipal Elections, Up to 3
Lags. (Dummy Mean Stock)
Vote share of municipal incumbent
in municipal elections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A: One lag
Dummy mean stock of voters with title (t) -0.0930*** -0.0736** -0.0720** -0.0679*
(0.0282) (0.0293) (0.0323) (0.0383)
Dummy mean stock of voters with title (t-1) -0.0246 -0.0183 -0.0051 -0.0110
(0.0235) (0.0231) (0.0246) (0.0277)
PANEL B: Two lags
Dummy mean stock of voters with title (t) -0.0895*** -0.0708** -0.0674** -0.0632*
(0.0286) (0.0294) (0.0319) (0.0379)
Dummy mean stock of voters with title (t-1) -0.0397* -0.0308 -0.0146 -0.0163
(0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0260) (0.0283)
Dummy mean stock of voters with title (t-2) 0.0262 0.0228 0.0246 0.0198
(0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0217) (0.0242)
PANEL C: Three lags
Dummy mean stock of voters with title (t) -0.0833*** -0.0668** -0.0640** -0.0613
(0.0292) (0.0296) (0.0316) (0.0373)
Dummy mean stock of voters with title (t-1) -0.0347 -0.0274 -0.0115 -0.0144
(0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0257) (0.0281)
Dummy mean stock of voters with title (t-2) 0.0077 0.0108 0.0185 0.0176
(0.0214) (0.0213) (0.0239) (0.0257)
Dummy mean stock of voters with title (t-3) 0.0363* 0.0252 0.0175 0.0093
(0.0220) (0.0233) (0.0192) (0.0218)
Includes state trends X
Includes municipality trends X
Includes ejido trends X
Observations 22,477 22,477 22,477 22,477
Number of precincts 4,202 4,202 4,202 4,202
Mean LHS 0.436 0.436 0.436 0.436
Notes: All regressions are at precinct level and include precinct fixed effects. "Dummy mean stock of voters (t)"
is a dummy that takes vaue 0 if the precinct hasn’t received land titles before t, or the mean number of voters
affected by the program at election time, where the mean is taken over all elections for which the program had
already reached the precinct. Errors are clustered at muincipal level.
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Table 1.7: Robustness Check: Effect on Vote Share of Municipal Incumbent in Municipal Elections, Up to 3
Lags. (Stock of Voters)
Vote share of municipal incumbent
in municipal elections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A: Two lags
Stock of voters with title (t) -0.0632*** -0.0502* -0.0476* -0.0514
(0.0244) (0.0257) (0.0260) (0.0313)
Stock of voters with title (t-1) -0.0357 -0.0373 -0.0236 -0.0251
(0.0239) (0.0241) (0.0267) (0.0293)
Stock of voters with title (t-2) 0.0434* 0.0370 0.0346 0.0261
(0.0256) (0.0263) (0.0250) (0.0275)
PANEL B: Three lags
Stock of voters with title (t) -0.0612** -0.0493* -0.0472* -0.0508
(0.0245) (0.0257) (0.0259) (0.0311)
Stock of voters with title (t-1) -0.0341 -0.0365 -0.0225 -0.0235
(0.0237) (0.0239) (0.0264) (0.0289)
Stock of voters with title (t-2) 0.0224 0.0258 0.0251 0.0209
(0.0270) (0.0278) (0.0281) (0.0295)
Stock of voters with title (t-3) 0.0363 0.0203 0.0222 0.0176
(0.0252) (0.0240) (0.0212) (0.0229)
Includes state trends X
Includes municipality trends X
Includes ejido trends X
Observations 22,477 22,477 22,477 22,477
R-squared 0.0445 0.0894 0.2336 0.2490
Number of precincts 4,202 4,202 4,202 4,202
Mean LHS 0.436 0.436 0.436 0.436
Notes: All regressions are at precinct level and include precinct fixed effects. "Stock of voters (t)" is the number
of voters in the precinct that received titles before t. Errors are clustered at muincipal level.
32
smaller in magnitude and never statistically significant. In addition to further supporting
our baseline estimates indicating that property rights significantly weaken the scope for
clientelistic exchanges, these estimates suggest that state and federal incumbents do not rely
on weak property rights to enforce their clientelistic transactions. Rather, they are more
likely to depend on the significant budget they are able to allocate to social programs and
public employment (Larreguy 2013).
Second, the lack of property rights on land is not the only opportunity for political
intermediation and vote buying. Another potentially important way of obtaining electoral
support is through public employment in municipal government. Although state and federal
employees outnumber municipal employees, such employment nevertheless represents an
effective local source of patronage in Mexico. Municipal incumbents can allocate positions
in the local government in exchange for voter mobilization, and municipal government
employees might perceive continuity in their position to be conditional upon the continuity
of the municipal incumbent party (Robinson and Verdier 2013a). As a result, we expect
municipal incumbents in municipalities with larger government employment to be less
susceptible to the effects of the land titling program. To test this argument, we interact our
two measures of land titling with the share of the municipal population working in the
government.29 The results in Table 1.11 show that, in precincts that belong to municipalities
with a larger share of government employees, the vote share of municipal incumbents is
less affected by the land titling program. This finding provides further support for our
claim that the titling program affects municipal incumbents’ vote share by weakening their
ability to enforce clientelistic exchanges. On the other hand, the results also suggest that
clientelistic ties may only be effectively severed when reforms are able target multiple tools
for facilitating exchanges.
29The data originates from the INEGI census conducted every decade (1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010).
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1.4.3 Alternative explanations
Our empirical analysis focuses on the electoral outcomes of incumbent parties as opposed
to the outcomes of particular parties to avoid the concern that our results are, in line
with the positive wealth effect of the program, confounded by a shift in voters preferences
toward more right-wing parties (de Janvry, Gonzalez-Navarro and Sadoulet 2014). However,
such concern remains if, as suggested by Table 1.2, incumbents and more clientelistic
parties in Mexico are disproportionately leftist or centrist. This concern is supported by
work suggesting that the granting of property rights improves expectations over economic
prospects and leads to better labor market, credit and investment opportunities (de Janvry
et al. forthcoming; Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrodsky 2007; Field 2005, 2007; Field and
Torero 2008), as well as by talks with beneficiaries of the CORETT’s titling program during
the focus groups that we conducted.
To address this concern, we explore how the effect of land titling in our baseline
specification in Table 1.4 vary with municipal incumbent party ideology. We consider two
different specifications. First, we estimate heterogeneous effects using a continuum measure
of ideology that takes value  1 if the incumbent is a left-wing party (mainly the PRD, the
Labor Party or PT, and the Citizen Movement Party or MC), 0 if it is a centrist party (mainly
the PRI, the Mexican Green Party or PVEM, and the New Alliance Party or PANAL), and 1
if it is a right-wing party (mainly the PAN). Second, we estimate heterogeneous effects using
an indicator of incumbent ideology—left and right—with the excluded ideology—center—
being the comparison group. Tables 1.12 and 1.13 present the corresponding results, which
both fail to support the possibility that our baseline estimates are driven by a rightward
shift in the preferences of the voters benefited by the CORETT titling program. If anything,
the results in 1.13 suggest that the allocation of property rights hurt right-wing incumbent
parties.
Another concern is that our baseline results, and the differences in the results that
rise when focusing on different levels of incumbency, reflect the possibility that the worse
electoral performance of municipal incumbents is due to their lack of resources to deliver
38
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the public goods that they are obliged to provide after the allocation of property rights. As
we show in section 1.2, in the absence of property rights, municipal incumbents can neglect
communities of squatters on the grounds that their illegal occupation prevents them from
being entitled to public goods. However, this ceases to be the case when the CORETT’s
program reaches those communities. To test this alternative explanation, we exploit the fact
that, under such explanation, municipal governments that are aligned with either the state
or federal incumbents—and consequently enjoy increased access to their resources—should
be affected less by the allocation of property rights. Tables 1.14 and 1.15 report the results
of specifications that respectively explore the heterogeneous effects of land titling by the
alignment of municipal incumbents with the state and federal governments. The absence
of significant differences provides no evidence that this competing explanation drives our
results.
1.4.4 Rewards to program implementing parties
Our estimates so far reflect the overall impact of the program on the electoral support for
the municipal incumbents. However, voters could also reward the parties directly involved
in the land titling program (De La O 2013; Manacorda, Miguel and Vigorito 2011; Zucco
2013). Importantly, because the CORETT program is administered at the federal level, this
credit claiming channel is more likely to change the conclusions of our analysis regarding
the effect of the CORETT’s titling program on the electoral support of state and federal
incumbents. To the extent that this also operates at the municipal level, it suggests that
our current estimates understate the impact of land titling on the breakdown of clientelism.
In this section, we explicitly account for such effects. Since we expect that any reward or
punishment for implementing the program would primarily affect the party responsible for
the titling at the federal level, but the ability to engage in clientelistic practices is affects all
future municipal incumbents, we can separate the two effects by exploiting variation in the
extent to which parties are responsible for past titling in different precincts.
Since qualitative accounts suggest that voters know that the federal government leads the
41
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program, the party that was in power at the federal level when land titles were distributed
in the precinct should be credited for its implementation.30 Table 1.16 reports the effect of
the program on the vote share for the municipal incumbent in municipal elections according
to the responsibility of the party for previous titling in the precinct.
The results indicate that voters reward parties involved in the program: municipal
incumbents with more involvement in the distribution of property rights on land receiver
greater political support at the municipal level. The results in column (1) indicate that a
municipal incumbent with average responsibility over titling suffers a 24.4% reduction in the
negative impact of the program on its vote share.31 Even though voters reward involvement
in the program, the net effect of being exposed to the program continues to be negative for
municipal incumbents (as indicated by the test at the bottom the table). Controlling for state,
municipality, or ejido trends does not affect this conclusion. Column (5) reports similar
results for an increase in the share of voters that received a title. For a municipal incumbent
with average responsibility over previous titling, the negative effect on vote share due to
an increase in the intensity of the program is 48% lower.32 Moreover, the net effect of an
increase in the intensity of the program, while sill negative, stops being statistically different
from zero at the 95% confidence level.
Table 1.17 shows instead the effect of the land titling program on the vote share received
by the federal incumbent in federal elections. We find that the program brings substantial
positive rewards for the federal incumbents responsible for the implementation of the
program. In our sample, federal incumbents have an average share of participation in
previous titling of 87.6%. The estimates in column (1) indicate that, in a precinct with
average exposure, the rewards to a federal incumbent with an average level of involvement
in the program is approximately 2.5 percentage points, or a 5% increase in the vote share of
30Omitted regressions where we run a race between all levels of incumbency also confirm this claim.
31The average share of previous titling that were responsibility of a municipal incumbent in our panel is 0.86
(among those incumbents that participated at all). Therefore, the average increase in vote share is 0.054 ⇥ 0.86 =
0.464, which is approximately 24.4% of the level effect of the program.
32The average increase in vote share is 0.071⇥0.86 = 0.061 which is approximately 48.2% of the level effect of
the program.
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the federal incumbent.33 An average increase in the share of voters that received a land title
entails an extra 2.2 percentage points or a 4.3% increase in the vote share for incumbents
with average level of involvement in the program, as reported in column (5).34 Columns
(2)-(4), and (6)-(8) show that the estimates of the electoral return of the titling program for
federal incumbents is robust to the inclusion of trends.
These important findings highlight the need to disentangle the effect of programmatic
policies on parties’ ability to enforce clientelistic exchanges from their effect on voters’
perceptions about parties’ ability and willingness to implement programmatic policies. Had
we restricted our analysis to the specification in Table 1.10, where there is no significant
effect of the CORETT’s titling program on the federal incumbent’s vote share, the ultimate
conclusion of this study would have been significantly different.
In sum, we find that voters reward municipal incumbents involved in the land titling
program, but those rewards do not completely offset the negative impact from a break down
of clientelistic ties. However, for federal incumbents responsible for the implementation
of the program the gains are larger and the overall impact of the program is positive.
These findings thus help to explain why federal incumbent parties implement programs
and reforms that might hurt their ability to enforce clientelistic exchanges (de Janvry,
Gonzalez-Navarro and Sadoulet 2014).
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that programmatic policies can simultaneously break down clien-
telistic ties whilst generating rewards for party responsible for the policy. In contrast
with previous studies focusing on a single level of government, our analysis across local
government—where clientelistic relationship can be most easily sustained—and the federal
government—which was primarily responsible for the implementation of the program—
33The average stock of voters exposed across municipalities is 20.9%. Thus 0.876⇥0.1344⇥0.209 = 0.0246
34Using that the average increase in the stock of voters is 18.4%, we obtain that 0.876⇥0.1345⇥0.184 = 0.0217
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is able to differentiate clientelistic from credit claiming forces associated with a major
land titling program. In particular, we identify persistent losses among future municipal
incumbents, especially among those lacking alternative resources to support clientelistic
transfers. Alongside the break down of clientelistic ties, we also find evidence of effective
credit-claiming by the federal incumbent. While the losses associated with a decline in
clientelistic capacity of a municipal incumbent are partially offset by alignment with the
federal incumbent, we find clear evidence that the federal incumbent is in fact rewarded for
its part in implementing the program. In addition to showing how the provision of property
rights can break down clientelistic ties, which represent a major challenge to democratic and
economic development across the developing world, our findings also explain why federal
incumbents may wish to implement popular programmatic policies that nevertheless reduce
their capacity to harvest votes by exploiting the dependence of voters on local government.
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Chapter 2
Political Turnover, Bureaucratic
Turnover, and the Quality of Public
Services1
2.1 Introduction
Party turnover entails not only a change of politicians in office, but also a change of officials
within the government. These officials typically hold strategic positions, which allows
politicians to gain control over the bureaucracy and facilitate the implementation of new
policies. However, party turnover can also permeate and potentially disrupt the appointment
process at lower levels of the bureaucracy.
In fact, the perception that the bureaucracy may be inefficiently exposed to political
factors is one of the reasons for the widespread adoption of civil service reforms in developed
countries, and for its advocacy in developing countries. Such reforms are thought to
improve the quality of public goods and services by insulating the bureaucracy from
political pressures, encouraging its professionalization, and fostering the use of meritocratic
appointments. However, an independent bureaucracy can also become entrenched and
1Co-authored with Mitra Akhtari and Diana Moreira
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develop weak incentives to perform. Hence, the ability of politicians to appoint and dismiss
government employees can not only smooth the implementation of new policies, but can also
strengthen the accountability of bureaucrats, potentially improving the delivery of public
goods and services. Overall, the effect of the intervention of politicians in the bureaucracy
is ex ante ambiguous.
This paper uses a regression discontinuity design on close mayoral elections in Brazil to
identify the effect of party turnover on teachers’ and headmasters’ appointments and the
consequences for students’ performance. Several reasons make education an ideal public
service to focus on. First, education provision is a crucial government function and includes
one of the largest numbers of employees in Brazilian municipalities. Second, education
quality has a precise and meaningful measure, namely, students’ test scores and dropout
rate. Third, the quality of education is particularly sensitive to the rotation of teachers and
headmasters, the public servants in charge of its delivery.
We find that teachers’ and headmasters’ appointments are affected by the political
process. When a new party takes office, there is a 10 percentage point increase in the share
of teachers who are replaced, and a 24 percentage point increase in the share of headmasters
who are replaced. The majority of the incoming teachers are hired using short-term contracts
and have not gone through the formal civil service screening process. Likewise, most of the
appointments for headmasters do not follow strict meritocratic rules but are designated by
politicians. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence about the use of school positions for
electoral purposes.
Party turnover also has real and persistent effects on education outcomes: in munici-
palities with a new party, the year after the election tests scores of fourth graders are 0.13
standard deviations lower and students’ dropout rate is 37% higher. The deterioration of
educational outcomes seems to persist. Three years after the election, test scores are still
lower and dropout rates are still higher in municipalities with party turnover. This suggests
that even if the new party intended to improve the quality of education, the overall effect
of party turnover on education is systematically negative, at least up to three years after
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the election. We believe that a more likely explanation is that the deterioration in education
quality is an unintended consequence of the disruption to the school-level bureaucracy that
obeys political reasons.
Several pieces of evidence suggest that party turnover affects students’ educational
attainment through the turnover of teachers and headmasters. First, we do not find
evidence that political turnover changes the resources received by the municipality or the
allocation of funds to education. This is evidence against the hypothesis that political
turnover lowers educational outcomes because a new political party faces difficulties in
securing funds for education provision. Second, we do not find evidence of differences
in teachers’ characteristics, which suggests that the results are not driven by a change in
their composition. Moreover, it also suggests that the appointment of teachers by the new
political party is not an attempt to draw in better-qualified teachers, at least on observable
characteristics. Third, students’ characteristics are similar as well; thus, sorting of students
into (or out of) municipal schools does not seem to explain the results. However, we do find
evidence that points to the existence of organizational maladjustments that may affect the
functioning of the schools: newly-appointed headmasters in municipalities with political
turnover have less experience in that role, and teachers’ reports about the headmaster are
more likely to be negative.
We are likely capturing the causal effect of political turnover. Treatment and control
municipalities are remarkably balanced on observables. Moreover, we do not detect manipu-
lation of electoral outcomes: the McCrary test does not find a significant discontinuity in the
distribution of municipalities around the cutoff. It may still be the case that voters punish
incumbent parties in municipalities where the quality of education is falling. However,
students’ performance in treatment and control municipalities is similar in levels and trends
prior to the election. Finally, results are robust to the inclusion of covariates, to the use of a
bandwidth smaller than optimal, and to controls for party identity or ideology.
We also find that the disruption of the bureaucracy is not circumscribed to education
services. We find that when a new party takes office, there is a significant increase in the
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total number of municipal employees: the share of new employees during the first year is
11 percentage points higher. This increase is concentrated during the first months after the
new party takes office, and is not compensated with a corresponding increase in the share
of employees leaving the municipal government, at least for the two years following the
election. Therefore, a change in parties inflates the bureaucracy. We thus believe that the
increase in turnover at the school level is part of a more general phenomenon; the main
difference is that the number of positions at the school level is naturally restricted by the
number of schools managed by the municipality.
Our work contributes to a growing empirical literature on the relationship between
bureaucrats and politicians and the relevance of the structure of the bureaucracy for
government performance. Iyer and Mani (2012) document how politicians in India use
frequent reassignments to control bureaucrats with career concerns, and they find evidence
that political transfers of bureaucrats is associated with increases in a poverty index. Rasul
and Rogger (2014) find that more autonomous bureaucrats are more likely to successfully
complete projects in Nigeria. Their finding is consistent with cross-country evidence on
the relevance of bureaucrats’ autonomy. Rauch (1995) and Rauch and Evans (2000) find a
significant relationship between the level of "weberianism" of the bureaucracy2 and different
measures of government performance. Interestingly, they find that meritocratic recruitment
is particularly predictive of positive bureaucratic performance, which is consistent with our
results using microeconomic data on education.
This paper also contributes to a body of work concerned with the relevance of teachers’
and headmaster’ stability for students’ outcomes. Within this literature, Miranda and
Pazello (2014) is close to our work. They are interested in measuring the impact of head-
master turnover on students’ performance in Brazilian municipalities, and instrument for
headmaster turnover with party turnover. We are more focused on the political economy
side of the story: we believe that the disruption of the bureaucracy is interesting on its own
2In his classic Economy and Society (1922), Weber argues that a clear separation between the bureaucracy and
politicians facilitates capitalist growth. Concretely, this separation includes the use of meritocratic recruitment
and rules that ensure predictable career paths within the bureaucracy.
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right, and we explore it at length. Whereas our results suggest that the disruption at the
school level has real costs for educational attainment, there is some work that suggests that
teachers’ job protection can also be harmful. In India, teacher unionization is associated
with lower student achievement (Kingdon and Teal 2010). Along the same lines, the use
of contract teachers and the increase in the flexibility of appointments improves teachers’
effort and students’ performance (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2013; Jacob 2010). Even
though this literature suggests that teachers’ entrenchment is a real problem, our results
indicate that political appointments may not be the right way of providing incentives to
public servants in the school.
Our findings suggest that positions at the school level in Brazil are used as electoral
patronage. From a theoretical standpoint, it is argued that patronage can indeed be
electorally advantageous as it solves a commitment problem between candidates and voters
(Robinson and Verdier 2013b). Consistent with this view, the incumbency advantage in
US states during the 20th century was more pronounced under patronage systems than
civil service systems, potentially contributing to party entrenchment (Folke, Hirano and
Snyder 2011b). Furthermore, the shift towards civil service systems has been found to have
real effects on government outcomes. Rauch (1995) studies the adoption of civil service
in US cities during the Progressive Era, and finds that the lengthening of bureaucratic
tenure led to an increase in the pursuit of longer-gestation projects. Whereas these papers
compare outcomes under different institutional arrangements, we do so for different political
situations within a given institutional context.
More broadly, our paper also contributes to an extensive literature on the costs and
benefits of institutions that promote political turnover. Term limits are one prominent
institutional feature along these lines. There are theoretical reasons as to why term limits are
beneficial (Smart and Sturm 2013); in practice, however, term limits have been found to have
some costs for government performance. For instance, Ferraz and Finan (2011) find that
term-limited incumbents are associated with an increase in corruption in Brazil and Besley
and Case (1995) find that term limits affect policy variables, in particular they increase taxes
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and government expenditures. On the other hand, Besley, Persson and Reynal-Querol (2013)
argue that, from a theoretical point of view, high turnover can lead incumbents to adopt
stronger executive constraints. These papers focus mainly on the effects associated with
the expectation of turnover, while we are concerned with the effects of the execution of
turnover. Moreover, a large literature studies the effect of a change in party identity on the
characteristics of adopted policies, mostly in developed countries. As an example, Ferreira
and Gyourko (2009) use close elections to study partisanship in US local politics. They
find that the party identity of the politician does not affect the size of city government,
the allocation of local public spending, or crime rates. In contrast, our results point to the
existence of a cost that, in principle, is unrelated to the identity of the party, but hinges
instead on the actual execution of political turnover.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional context
and the data. Section 3, discusses the empirical strategy. Section 4 shows results on the
effect of party turnover on turnover at the school level. Section 5 reports the results for
the quality of education provision. Section 6 discusses potential mechanisms that could
account for the results found in section 5. Section 7 presents further robustness checks for
our results at the school level. Section 8 looks at the impact of party turnover on municipal
employees more generally. Section 9 concludes.
2.2 Institutional context and data
2.2.1 Institutional context
This section provides information about Brazilian municipalities and mayoral elections, as
well as the education sector in Brazil.
There are 5,570 municipalities in Brazil. Municipal elections are held in October every
four years on the same day across the country. Mayors take office in January the following
year. Mayors can hold office for only two consecutive terms; they have the possibility
to return after a one-term hiatus. Municipal governments are highly decentralized and
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autonomous. Furthermore, municipal employment is a large part of public sector employ-
ment: municipal employment was 47% of public employment in 2002 and 52.6% of public
employment in 2010. Therefore understanding how the political process affects municipal
employment is very important in this context.
The education sector in Brazil is the ideal setting for studying the "transition costs” of
turnover for several reasons. First, education is the main responsibility of local governments.
They are mandated to allocate 25% of their revenue to education (this is in addition to any
funding the municipality gets for education from the federal government). Additionally,
local governments control a sizable portion of public schools: in 2007, 80% of all public
schools were managed by municipal governments. The municipality is responsible for
all decisions regarding the daily operations of the school: distribution of school lunches,
providing school transportation, and the hiring, paying, and training of teachers. Mayors
are required by law to hire teachers according to very strict procedures: potential teaching
candidates participate in a widely advertised exam and those with the highest rank are
hired as teachers and granted job security. However, in practice, mayors exert considerable
discretion in hiring temporary teachers using short-term contracts.3 School principals often
report that dealing with a new team every year is a frequent and major challenge.4 Mayors
are also responsible for hiring headmasters in some municipalities. In 6.3% of municipalities,
headmasters are hired using a public exam, in 43% of municipalities, they are elected by the
public, and in 45% of municipalities, they are nominated by politicians (Associa Nacional de
Pradua e Pesquisa em Educa). The school headmaster is often a teacher from the same school
who is promoted or elected to the headmaster position. The second reason for focusing on
education is due to how education is funded in Brazil. Most of the funds for education,
3The mayor of Areia, Paraiba, was prosecuted for hiring numerous short-term teachers without going
through official procedures (http://www.liberdade96fm.com.br; accessed on October 20, 2014).
4Principal and school staff report that around 35% of their teachers turn over every year. They feel managing
the school under these conditions is very challenging. As the Secretary of Education of Saulo has put it: "High
rotation rate transforms the school into a space without soul, where a lot of people circulate with no commitment
to the school collective.” (http://gestaoescolar.abril.com.br/formacao/rotatividade-professores-483054.shtml;
accessed October 20, 2014).
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especially those funds that ensure the daily operations of the schools, such as funds for
teacher wages and textbooks, come from a federal fund called FUNDEF, a non-discretionary
fund that pays a fixed rate per student enrolled in municipal schools.5 Thus the funding of
the daily operations of the education sector is less likely to be affected by political cycles and
political alliances. The third reason for focusing on education goes beyond the institutional
context of Brazil and is related to the production function of education. The quality of
education is more likely to depend on inter-personal relationships and organizational norms,
as compared to, for example, road construction. Therefore education, in any country, is
precisely where the costs of turnover of employees can have pronounced effects. Finally,
contract teachers are becoming increasingly common in developing countries (Muralidharan
and Sundararaman 2013) which renders education provision susceptible to political factors.
2.2.2 Data
Our empirical analysis combines four Brazilian data sources. First, we use data on electoral
outcomes of local government executive bodies (e.g. mayor position in each municipality).
Second, we use data on formal workers in Brazil. In particular, we focus on employees
in municipal governments. Third, we use data on several aspects of education provision
including measures of educational quality, such as test scores and dropout rates, and key
inputs in education, such as student’s socio-economic background, teachers’ characteristics
and teachers’ (re)assignment. Fourth, we complement these data with municipalities’
socioeconomic characteristics.
The election results come from the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral which oversees all local,
state, and federal elections in Brazil. We use this data to construct the vote margin of the
candidate with the highest votes compared to the vote margin of the incumbent party for
the 2008 election.6
5See Menezes-Filho and Pazello (2007) for a description of FUNDEF.
6We do not consider earlier elections because some of our outcome variables are missing for previous
election cycles. Soon outcome variables for 2013 will be released and we will be able to incorporate the 2012
election cycle into our empirical analysis.
56
The data on Brazilian public workers comes from the Ministry of Work and Employment
of Brazil. This dataset has an annual frequency, and follows all employees in the formal sector.
It contains information about the position, wage, and basic demographic characteristics of
employees. We use the data that corresponds to the period 2007 to 2009.
The data on education outcomes are from two different sources. The first is the Censo
Escolar which is the annual survey filled by every school in Brazil. A large share of the
educational budget is determined based on the enrollment figures in this census, and in
recent years, the government has begun auditing the information from this census; thus
misreporting can have consequences. Therefore we believe this survey is accurate and
reliable. We use Censo Escolar from three years, 2007, 2009 and 2011, to construct the
following outcomes: teachers’ turnover (percent and number of teachers who departed and
entered a school between 2007 and 2009, or between 2007 and 2011) and characteristics of
movers (age and years of schooling of teachers who departed and entered a school between
2007 and 2009, or between 2007 and 2011). The survey also asks for information on the
schools’ facilities and infrastructure: whether the school is located in an urban or rural area,
whether the principal has an office, whether there are administrative and/or educational
computers, etc. We use the information on school facilities and infrastructure as controls and
to check for balance between treatment and control municipal schools. The reference date of
the survey is May 31st of every year. So the survey should be thought of as an assessment of
the school five months after the mayor has been in power. The second source for education
outcomes is Prova Brasil, a standardized national exam taken by all public school attendees,
in 4th and 8th grade, with 20 or more students. This exam is conducted every two years.
We use four years of data (2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011) to construct our test score measures.
Prova Brasil also conducts surveys about all students who take the exam, the associated
teacher, and the associated headmaster. We use the headmaster survey to construct our
measure of headmaster turnover. Moreover, these surveys from Prova Brasil provide us
with demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of students, teachers, and headmasters.
The exam is taken around mid-November and should be thought as an assessment of the
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school eleven months after the mayor has been in power. Figure 2.1 illustrates the timing of
election, Censo Escolar, and Prova Brasil.
Figure 2.1: Timeline of Election and Data Collection
The last source of data is Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE). We use this
source to gather information such as population, GDP per capital, and average years of
schooling in the municipality.
2.3 Empirical strategy
To estimate the effect of party turnover7 on bureaucratic turnover and other outcomes,
one cannot compare the outcomes of interest in municipalities that experience a change
in the ruling party with municipalities that do not experience a change in the ruling party.
A municipality with an incompetent ruling party is likely to have bad outcomes across
numerous measures, and the constituency may be more likely to vote for a change in the
next election cycle. On the other hand, constituents of a municipality with an effective
local government and good provision of public goods and services may be more likely to
vote to keep the same party in the next election cycle. Therefore, comparing outcomes of
these two sets of municipalities could result in a correlation between party turnover and
outcomes that does not reflect the causal effect of interest. In order to identify the impact of
a change in the ruling party, we compare municipalities where the incumbent party barely
7We have also analyzed the effect of incumbent turnover (not reported here). Results are similar but
somewhat weaker.
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lost (treatment municipalities) with municipalities where the incumbent party barely won
(control municipalities). That is, we use a sharp regression discontinuity design on close
elections.
Our main specification is a local linear regression. For our main outcomes of interest
(headmaster turnover, teachers turnover, test scores, and dropout rates) we have calculated
the optimal bandwidth using both the procedures proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) and by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). In order to keep the sample consistent
across different estimations and to minimize bias concerns from using a larger-than-optimal
bandwidth , we fix the bandwidth to be 5%, the smallest of all the optimal bandwidths
estimated. We define close elections as those where the difference between the vote share
of the incumbent party and the vote share of the best opponent falls within that range. Or
main specification is as follows:
Y = a+ bDm + g⇥Marginm + dDm ⇥Marginm + jX+ #; (2.1)
where Y is the outcome variable of interest (bureaucratic turnover, students’ test scores,
teacher and headmaster turnover, etc), the variable Dm is a dummy variable equal to one if
the incumbent party loses, i.e. there is party turnover; Marginm, is the difference between
the vote share of the incumbent party and the vote share of the best opponent party; X
is a set of controls that includes the baseline value of the dependent variable, municipal
characteristics, school characteristics, and students’ characteristics (whenever appropriate).
Given that our treatment is at the municipality level, we cluster all standard errors at the
municipality level.
As a robustness check, we also report the results of the following specification:
Y = a+ bDm + jX+ #; (2.2)
for municipalities where the margin of win is less than 3%. Since the number of
municipalities in this sample is small, we do a comparison of means, as opposed to
controlling for margin of win, in order to avoid overfitting problems. Furthermore, we
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estimate a cubic specification using the sample with 25% margin of win.
The identification assumption is that outcomes are continuous around the cutoff, thus
any discontinuity is the result of the treatment assignment. While it is not possible to fully
test this assumption, Table 2.1 shows that municipalities are remarkably similar in terms
of observables prior to the election. We do not find evidence of differences in economic or
demographic characteristics of the municipalities, schools, or students therein; this lends
support to our identification assumption.
Table 2.1: Balance Check
Sample: 5% window Uncond. Mean Balance
N Control Treat Diff S.E. P-val
Municipality Level Characteristics
Average years of schooling 2004 585 4.213 4.254 -0.133 0.192 0.489
GDP per capita 2007 594 5.160 6.076 1.087 0.838 0.195
Pop share w/Bolsa Familia 2007 594 0.0793 0.0788 0.00686 0.00725 0.345
Unemployment rate 2000 593 9.795 10.34 0.798 0.989 0.420
Population 2007 594 18834 19609 891.2 4,752 0.851
Public sector/GDP 594 0.260 0.244 -0.0157 0.0215 0.466
Federal transfers/GDP 572 2.256 1.987 -1.760 1.246 0.158
State transfers/GDP 572 0.688 1.321 2.876 2.729 0.292
Education expend/Total expend 580 0.465 0.468 0.0196 0.0250 0.433
Share of right wing parties 2007 594 0.00623 0.0183 0.0356 0.0241 0.140
Share of centrist parties 2007 594 0.729 0.755 0.0476 0.0767 0.535
Share of left wing parties 2007 594 0.265 0.227 -0.0832 0.0748 0.267
Bureaucracy Characteristics
Number of bureaucrats 2007 594 423.3 482.6 22.28 108.7 0.838
Quantity hired 2007 594 107.6 127.1 -40.28 39.75 0.311
Quantity left 2007 594 73.28 85.75 -9.560 24.31 0.694
Share hired 2007 593 0.360 0.318 0.202 0.122 0.0995
Share left 2007 593 0.384 0.340 0.121 0.148 0.412
Average age 2007 536 39.70 39.69 -0.304 0.413 0.463
Primary education 2007 594 151.0 171.9 22.96 40.36 0.570
Highschool education 2007 594 182.7 204.3 4.379 53.28 0.935
College+ education 2007 594 123.9 147.7 -35.78 47.37 0.450
Wage rate (% of min wage) 2007 536 2.118 2.181 -0.0405 0.109 0.711
Seniority 2007 536 98.91 97.55 -3.303 5.802 0.569
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Table 2.1: Balance Check (continued)
Sample: 5% window Uncond. Mean Balance
N Control Treat Diff S.E. P-val
Hours worked 2007 536 36.82 36.53 -0.531 0.915 0.562
Under contract 2007 594 98.58 125.3 27.05 51.09 0.597
Has tenure 2007 594 345.1 378.8 -27.82 91.28 0.761
Under temporary contract 2007 594 13.88 19.84 -7.682 12.29 0.532
Municipal School Characteristics
Average number of teachers 2007 2,752 17.79 18 -1.110 1.644 0.500
% urban 2,706 1.256 1.291 0.0759 0.0770 0.324
% pipe water 2007 2,705 0.787 0.798 -0.116 0.0846 0.169
% pipe sewer 2007 2,705 0.368 0.410 0.00347 0.0953 0.971
% headmaster has office 2007 2,706 0.792 0.785 -0.0769 0.0574 0.181
% has computer lab 2,706 0.243 0.286 -0.0115 0.0668 0.863
% bathroom inside 2007 2,706 0.961 0.956 -0.0546 0.0302 0.0711
Dropout rate 2007 2,465 3.735 3.579 -0.0978 1.0325 0.925
Head politically appointed 2007 1,835 0.333 0.394 0.0336 0.0812 0.680
Share of tenured teachers 2007 1,876 0.674 0.690 -0.00614 0.0798 0.939
Baseline Scores
Math 4th grade (standardized) 1,963 -0.0553 0.0437 0.164 0.221 0.458
Portuguese 4th grade (stand) 1,963 -0.0466 0.0306 0.172 0.216 0.426
Math 8th grade(standardized) 717 -0.0425 0.0687 -0.248 0.268 0.355
Portuguese 8th grade (stand) 717 -0.0532 0.0791 -0.0929 0.274 0.735
Students Characteristics
% with computer 2,760 0.198 0.208 -0.0171 0.0364 0.638
% lives with both parents 2,557 0.693 0.699 0.0164 0.0250 0.511
% works 2,715 0.199 0.183 -0.0190 0.0216 0.378
% has car 2,747 0.326 0.348 -0.0281 0.0546 0.607
% sees mother reading 2,738 0.844 0.854 0.0232 0.0273 0.395
% male 2,735 0.508 0.509 0.00512 0.0217 0.813
Age 2,754 11.87 11.79 -0.0421 0.237 0.859
Notes: All calculations are made over the sample within the 5% bandwidth. The unconditional means are just
the sample means for the treatment and control municipalities. The values reported in the balance correspond to
the variable "political turnover" in the local linear regression that is our main specification throughout the paper.
Errors are robust for municipality level characteristics, and bureaucracy characteristics. Errors are clustered at
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the municipality level for school characteristics, scores, and students characteristics.
Another threat to the validity of the empirical strategy is the possibility of manipulation of vote shares
in close elections, in a way that correlates with other characteristics that affect our outcomes of interest. For
instance, more corrupt incumbents may be both more likely to commit fraud in the election and more likely to
provide ineffective public goods and services. Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of municipalities according to
the vote margin of the incumbent party. The distribution is fairly smooth around the cutoff, and the McCrary
test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no manipulation of the running variable.
Figure 2.2: McCrary Test
Notes: This figure reports the density of municipalities on the running variable, i.e. vote margin of incumbent
party.
In sum, we do not find evidence of differences in characteristics across control and treatment municipalities
or sorting around the cutoff, which suggests that the identification assumption for our RDD strategy holds.
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2.3.1 Our sample
A number of steps restrict the sample to be used in our estimations. First, our running variable is defined only
for municipalities where the incumbent party is running for reelection. Of the 5,570 municipalities in Brazil, we
identified 2,659 (48%) that meet this criteria. This number is relatively low because in many cases the incumbent
party supports another party in the 2008 elections (coalitions are a common feature of local politics in Brazil).
Second, we focus on municipalities where the party taking office was chosen in the first round. This means we
exclude 18 municipalities where the incumbent party ran for reelection and the election went to the second
round: Second-round elections occur in municipalities with more than 200,000 inhabitants where no candidate
reaches the 50% threshold for an outright win. The sample also excludes municipalities that had supplementary
elections, which happens when null votes are enough to change the result of the election. This is the case for 70
municipalities. Of the remaining 2,572 municipalities, close elections (5% margin) account for 594 municipalities,
which is our final sample. Moreover, since Prova Brasil is taken only when 20 or more students are present in
the classroom, our sample contains the largest 36% of primary municipal schools in those municipalities.
In other words, our results are representative of municipalities where the incumbent party ran for reelection
and the winner was defined in the first round, and where elections were close. These municipalities are
smaller, slightly richer, with relatively smaller schools, lower dropout rates and approximately 6% more of the
headmaster positions appointed by politicians.
2.4 Effect of party turnover on teachers and headmasters
Headmasters play a key role in the implementation of government policies, disciplining of teachers, overseeing
the academic curriculum, and providing cohesion within the school.
Headmasters are more likely to be replaced when a new party takes office. Figure 2.3 shows the share of
headmasters that have been in that position (within the same school) for less than two years as of November
2009, as a function of the margin of win of the incumbent party. There is a clear discontinuity in the share of
new headmasters with turnover: approximately 24 percentage points more headmasters are new.
The estimates in Table 2.2 confirm this result. Moreover, the result is robust to the inclusion of controls, and
to a narrower bandwidth, lending support to the causal interpretation of our finding. In Table 2.2 we also see
that the rate of change of headmasters in the control group is high: even without party turnover, approximately
40% of the headmasters change. This is the rate accumulated over 2 years, which partially accounts for its high
level; even so, it is consistent with public’s perception and anecdotal accounts of a pervasive problem of high
turnover in the education system in Brazil.
The effect of party turnover is not restricted to headmasters. Figure 2.4 shows the existence of a discontinuity
in the share of teachers entering and exiting the school. The outcome variable is calculated as the share of
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Figure 2.3: Effect of Party Turnover on Headmaster Turnover
Notes: This figure displays the average share of headmasters in that position for less than two
years (in 2009) by vote margin. Only headmasters of primary municipal schools that took Prova
Brasil were included. No covariates were included.
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Table 2.2: Effect of Party Turnover on Headmaster Turnover
Dependent variable: Less than 2 years as headmaster in this school as of 2009
5% window 3% window Cubic, 25% window
Party turnover 0.2489*** 0.2967*** 0.2204*** 0.2443*** 0.2024** 0.2102**
(0.0813) (0.0793) (0.0603) (0.0558) (0.0812) (0.0849)
Observations 2,290 1,872 1,443 1,204 8,849 7,247
Clusters 481 454 280 266 1632 1539
Control group mean 0.418 0.418 0.415 0.415 0.408 0.408
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: Only headmasters of primary municipal schools that took Prova Brasil were included. Controls are: years
of schooling at the municipal level, per capita GDP in 2007, share of population that received Bolsa Familia in
2007, unemployment rate in 2007, whether the school is in an urban or rural area, number of teachers in the
school in 2007, whether the school counts with water pipes, sewer pipes, office for the principal, computer lab,
and bathroom inside the school, proportion of students that have a computer, that live with both parents, that
work, that have a car, that observe their mother reading. Errors are clustered at the municipality level.
teachers that are new to the school and the share of teachers that have left the school in 2009 with respect to
those in 2007. Table 2.3 shows that schools in municipalities with turnover see a 16 percentage point increase in
teachers entering the school and a 9 percentage point increase in teachers leaving the school. These results are
robust to the inclusion of controls and to narrowing the bandwidth. Moreover, the overall number of teachers at
the municipality level is not significantly different, although the point estimate is positive. This is likely the case
because the number of schools restricts the number of teaching positions, and municipalities typically face a
shortage in the supply of teachers (at least in the short run).
The increase in turnover, both of teachers and headmasters, could reflect an attempt to improve the quality
of education. However, anecdotal evidence points to widespread use of teachers and headmaster positions
for electoral purposes. Teachers that support a given party within the community, receive a promotion to
headmaster in exchange if the party wins8.
Moreover, most action comes from political appointments. Column (1) and (2) of Table 2.4 conditions the
effect of party turnover on whether the headmaster was politically appointed prior to the election. We find that
a large part of the turnover of headmaster is concentrated on schools that were already "politicized". It should
8For example, the following two articles discuss survey evidence on the prevalence of politically
appointed school principals, noting that "the political [appointment of headmasters] tends to discour-
age students, faculty, and staff, because they do not see the [headmaster] as a person with support"
from colleagues and the community: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/cotidian/ff1010200702.htm and
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/cotidian/ff1010200701.htm (accessed on February 18,2015).
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Table 2.3: Effect of Party Turnover on Teacher Turnover
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3)
5% window New (share) Left (share) Net change
Party turnover 0.1638** 0.0596 0.0966*** 0.0740** 0.0672 -0.0144
(0.0667) (0.0563) (0.0328) (0.0313) (0.0580) (0.0432)
Observations 2,705 2,267 2,705 2,267 2,705 2,267
Clusters 557 530 557 530 557 530
Control group mean 0.636 0.636 0.461 0.461 0.175 0.175
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
3% window
Party turnover 0.1214*** 0.0864** 0.0802*** 0.0666*** 0.0413 0.0198
(0.0396) (0.0376) (0.0212) (0.0216) (0.0306) (0.0262)
Observations 1,702 1,453 1,702 1,453 1,702 1,453
Clusters 325 312 325 312 325 312
Control group mean 0.592 0.592 0.458 0.458 0.134 0.134
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Cubic, 25% window
Party turnover 0.1060* 0.0736 0.0836** 0.0720** 0.0224 0.0017
(0.0568) (0.0597) (0.0325) (0.0323) (0.0449) (0.0445)
Observations 10,480 8,782 10,480 8,782 10,480 8,782
Clusters 1864 1775 1864 1775 1864 1775
Control group mean 0.636 0.636 0.459 0.459 0.177 0.177
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: The share of new teachers and teachers that left the position were calculated over the total number of
teachers in 2007. The outcome variable of column 3 is the sum of all teachers that are new at the municipal
level minus the sum of all teachers that left a position at the municipal level, over the total number of teachers
in the municipality in 2007. Controls are: years of schooling at the municipal level, per capita GDP in 2007,
share of population that received Bolsa Familia in 2007, unemployment rate in 2007, whether the school is in an
urban or rural area, number of teachers in the school in 2007, whether the school counts with water pipes, sewer
pipes, office for the principal, computer lab, and bathroom inside the school, proportion of students that have a
computer, that live with both parents, that work, that have a car, that observe their mother reading. Errors are
clustered at the municipality level.
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Figure 2.4: Effect of Party Turnover on Teacher Turnover
Notes: These figures display the average share of teachers that are new or exited in 2009, by vote margin. The
denominator is the number of teachers in 2007. Only primary municipal schools that took Prova Brasil were
included. No covariates were included.
be noted that many schools do not report type of appointment in 2007, and so this result is not conclusive but
only suggestive. It could still be the case that the new party is trying to replace headmasters with the "wrong"
incentives with better headmasters. However, we find that the incoming headmasters are mostly politically
appointed as well. The dependent variable for column (3) and (4) is a dummy that takes value 1 if the school has
a new headmaster in 2009 and this headmaster is politically appointed, and 0 otherwise. We see that political
turnover significantly increases the appointment of these type of headmasters. At the same time, we do not find
a similar effect for other types of appointments. Column (5) and (6) reports the results for new headmasters
with other types of appointments. The estimates are small and not significant in this case.
The fact that most action happens through political appointments is consistent with the use of school
positions for patronage practices. However, it could still just reflect that the incoming mayors are genuinely
trying to improve the quality of education but face institutional constraints to execute their decisions. In the
next section, we discuss the effect on students outcomes.
2.5 Quantifying the impact of party turnover on education quality
We have established that party turnover affects the appointment of teachers and headmasters. Does this matter
for the quality of education? As mentioned previously, there are numerous reasons to focus on education when
studying the impact of party turnover on the quality of public services. For example, teachers and headmasters
are key in the production function of eduction and contract teachers are becoming more common across the
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Table 2.4: Headmaster Turnover and Political Appointments
Dependent variable: Less than 2 years as headmaster in 2009
All And pol. appoint. And other appoint.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Party turnover 0.1366* 0.1565** 0.2272*** 0.2589*** 0.0243 0.0385
(0.0827) (0.0702) (0.0702) (0.0730) (0.0576) (0.0730)
Pol appoint before elec-
tion
0.0442 0.0018
(0.0502) (0.0523)
Pol appoint before elec-
tion*Party turnover
0.2362** 0.2237***
(0.0919) (0.0812)
Observations 978 974 2,251 1,848 2,251 1,848
Clusters 253 250 480 450 480 450
Control group mean 0.4 0.4 0.12 0.12 0.29 0.29
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: Only headmasters of primary municipal schools that took Prova Brasil were included. The dependent
variable in Column (1) and (2) is an indicator that takes value 1 if the headmaster is new in the school after
the election, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in column (3) and (4) is an indicator that takes value
1 if the headmaster is new in the school after the election and it was politically appointed, and 0 otherwise.
The dependent variable in column (5) and (6) is an indicator that takes value 1 if the headmaster is new in the
school after the election and it was not politically appointed, and 0 otherwise. "Political appointment before the
election" is a dummy that takes value 1 if the headmaster in 2007 reported that he/she had been politically
appointed to the school. Controls are: years of schooling at the municipal level, per capita GDP in 2007, share
of population that received Bolsa Familia in 2007, unemployment rate in 2007, whether the school is in an urban
or rural area, number of teachers in the school in 2007, whether the school counts with water pipes, sewer
pipes, office for the principal, computer lab, and bathroom inside the school, proportion of students that have a
computer, that live with both parents, that work, that have a car, that observe their mother reading. Errors are
clustered at the municipality level.
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developing world (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2013) which renders education provision susceptible
to political factors. Additionally, test scores are a direct measure of service quality and are unlikely to be
differentially manipulated in places with and without political turnover. Moreover, test scores directly relate to
welfare at the individual level. In this section, we look at the impact of party turnover on education outcomes,
and in the next section we investigate the relationship with the increase in turnover of teachers and headmasters.
2.5.1 Effect on test scores and dropout rates the year after the election
In order to assess the effect of party turnover on the quality of education, we focus on two of the most important
measures of student performance: test scores and dropout rates of primary school students. Specifically, we use
math and Portuguese test scores for 4th and 8th graders and dropout rate at the school level in 2009, the first
year in office for the (sometimes new) party. We combine math and Portuguese into a single score at the student
level, and express it in units of standard deviation of the control group. Figure 2.5 shows the effect of party
turnover on test scores. When a new party takes office, test scores of both 4th graders and 8th graders decrease.
As Table 2.5 repots, we estimate a decrease between 0.095 and 0.133 standard deviations for 4th graders, and
between 0.087 and 0.079 for 8th graders. Even though the decrease is statistically not different for 4th and 8th
graders, it is significant only for 4th graders. This is likely to be the case because federal and state governments
control the majority of schools that offer later grades. This means that our sample of municipal schools that
offer 8th grade classes is substantially smaller than our sample of municipal schools that offer 4th grade classes
and, hence, so is the number of 8th grade students in our sample.
Figure 2.5: Effect of Party Turnover on Test Scores
Notes: Scores are expressed in terms of standard deviations of the control group in 2009. The lag of the outcome
variable in 2007 is included as a control, but no other covariates are included. Only students in municipal
schools are included.
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Table 2.5: Effect of Party Turnover on Test Scores
PANEL A: 4th grade
Dependent variable: Total score 4th graders in 2009
5% window 3% window Cubic, 25% window
Party turnover -0.1338** -0.0958** -0.0925*** -0.1016*** -0.0911 -0.0973**
(0.0581) (0.0461) (0.0348) (0.0272) (0.0556) (0.0473)
Observations 107,016 106,769 68,542 68,412 428,198 425,583
Clusters 499 493 291 288 1668 1653
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
PANEL B: 8th grade
Dependent variable: Total score 8th graders in 2009
5% window 3% window Cubic, 25% window
Party turnover -0.0876 -0.0792 -0.0450 -0.0443 0.0223 0.0196
(0.0608) (0.0649) (0.0387) (0.0393) (0.0599) (0.0607)
Observations 35,459 35,322 21,983 21,933 148,530 147,949
Clusters 292 287 169 167 977 967
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: Scores are expressed in terms of standard deviations of the control group in 2009. Only municipal
schools are included. The lag of the outcome variable in 2007 is included as a control. Controls are: years of
schooling at the municipal level, per capita GDP in 2007, share of population that received Bolsa Familia in
2007, unemployment rate in 2007, whether the school is in an urban or rural area, number of teachers in the
school in 2007, whether the school counts with water pipes, sewer pipes, office for the principal, computer lab,
and bathroom inside the school, proportion of students that have a computer, that live with both parents, that
work, that have a car, that observe their mother reading. Errors are clustered at the municipality level.
The difference between municipalities with and without turnover could reflect differences in performance
prior to 2009, that could have led to the outcome of the election. However, not only were test scores similar in
control and treatment municipalities, as shown in Figure 2.6, but so were the pre-trends in test scores.
Party turnover is not significant when we estimate our main specification for test scores of 4th graders in
2007,9 controlling for the corresponding scores in 2005. Table 2.6 reports this estimation. Importantly, the point
estimates are small and not robust across different specifications.
Party turnover also affects the dropout rates, as shown in Figure 2.7. The year after the election, the overall
9Prova Brasil was taken for the first time in 2005, and only results for 4th graders are available.
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Figure 2.6: Test Scores Before the Election
Notes: Scores are expressed in terms of standard deviations of the entire sample. No controls are included.
Only students in municipal schools are included.
Table 2.6: No Pre-Trend in Test Scores
Dependent variable: Total score 4th graders in 2007
5% window 3% window Cubic, 25% window
Party turnover 0.0225 -0.0502 -0.0144
(0.1125) (0.0757) (0.1078)
Total test score in 2005 0.7555*** 0.7581*** 0.7442***
(0.0245) (0.0275) (0.0228)
Observations 1,327 868 5,378
Clusters 440 253 1474
Controls NO NO NO
Notes: This table shows our main specifications for scores of 4th graders in 2007, controlling for scores of 4th
graders in 2005. Only municipal schools are included. 8th graders are not included because we do not have test
scores for them in 2005. Errors are clustered at the municipality level.
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dropout rate increases by 1 percentage point in primary schools managed by the municipality (Table 2.7) in
municipalities that have a new party in power. Since the dropout rate is 2.7% for control schools, this means
that a party change leads to a 37% increase in students’ dropout. This finding is consistent with the fact that
performance in school is a determinant of retention. Moreover, preexisting differences do not seem to explain
the result on dropout rates either: before the election (i.e. 2007), schools were similar in municipalities with and
without party turnover. The absence of discontinuities can be seen in Figure 2.8.
Figure 2.7: Effect of Party Turnover on Dropout Rate
Notes: The outcome variable is the percentage of students in the school that dropped out during 2009. The lag
of the outcome variable in 2007 is included as a control, but no other covariates are included. Only municipal
schools are included.
2.5.2 Effect on test scores and dropout rates three years after the election
Do the negative effects persist over time? This is an important question not only from a welfare perspective, but
also in order to interpret the results found so far. It is possible that the negative effect during the year after the
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Table 2.7: Effect of Party Turnover on Dropout Rate
Dependent variable: Overall dropout rate in 2009
5% window 3% window Cubic, 25% window
Party turnover 0.9971** 0.7991** 0.6847*** 0.5638*** 0.4479 0.3205
(0.4514) (0.3983) (0.2455) (0.1847) (0.4477) (0.4272)
Observations 2,447 2,447 1,550 1,550 9,278 9,278
Clusters 539 539 316 316 1794 1794
Control group mean 2.693 2.693 2.572 2.572 2.722 2.722
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: The outcome variable is the percentage of students in the school that dropped out during 2009. The lag
of the outcome variable in 2007 is included as a control. Controls are: years of schooling at the municipal level,
per capita GDP in 2007, share of population that received Bolsa Familia in 2007, unemployment rate in 2007,
whether the school is in an urban or rural area, number of teachers in the school in 2007, whether the school
counts with water pipes, sewer pipes, office for the principal, computer lab, and bathroom inside the school,
proportion of students that have a computer, that live with both parents, that work, that have a car, that observe
their mother reading. Only municipal schools are included. Errors are clustered at the municipality level.
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Figure 2.8: Dropout Rate Before the Election
Notes: The outcome variable is the percentage of students in the school that dropped out during 2007. Only
municipal schools are included. No controls were included.
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election is compensated in the long run. This could be the case if the incoming political party is sincerely trying
to improve the quality of education: it makes some changes that are initially disruptive but that improve the
quality of schools and test scores in the longer run. We use test scores and dropout rates in 2011, three years
after the election, to check this hypothesis.
Table 2.8 reports the effect on test scores of the cohorts that are 4th and 8th graders in 2011 (three years after
the election), who were 2nd and 6th graders in 2009 (the year after the election). The estimates indicate that
three years after the election, test scores are still lower in municipalities with party turnover, particularly so for
the older cohort. It is important to emphasize that we do not have a panel: we cannot track the same students
over time to see what happens to their outcomes three years after they have experienced political turnover.
Table 2.8: Effect of Party Turnover on Test Scores 3 Years After Election
PANEL A: 4th grade
Dependent variable: Total score 4th graders in 2011
5% window 3% window Cubic, 25% window
Party turnover -0.1071 -0.0328 -0.0684 -0.0427 -0.0808 -0.0305
(0.0758) (0.0567) (0.0470) (0.0342) (0.0775) (0.0610)
Observations 80,443 79,913 53,110 52,995 294,723 292,585
Clusters 465 463 268 267 1559 1545
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
PANEL B: 8th grade
Dependent variable: Total score 8th graders in 2011
5% window 3% window Cubic, 25% window
Party turnover -0.1163 -0.1669*** -0.0696 -0.1050** -0.0501 -0.0205
(0.0837) (0.0641) (0.0513) (0.0410) (0.0744) (0.0603)
Observations 32,195 32,157 20,073 20,073 118,136 118,098
Clusters 285 284 163 163 946 945
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: Scores are expressed in terms of standard deviations of the control group in 2011. Only municipal
schools are included. The lag of the outcome variable in 2007 is included as a control. Controls are: years of
schooling at the municipal level, per capita GDP in 2007, share of population that received Bolsa Familia in
2007, unemployment rate in 2007, whether the school is in an urban or rural area, number of teachers in the
school in 2007, whether the school counts with water pipes, sewer pipes, office for the principal, computer lab,
and bathroom inside the school, proportion of students that have a computer, that live with both parents, that
work, that have a car, that observe their mother reading. Errors are clustered at the municipal level.
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Table 2.8 points out that party turnover has effects on students one year after the shock and on (a different
group of) students three years after the shock. Similarly, dropout rates in municipalities with a new party in
power are still higher in 2011, as shown in Table 2.9.
Table 2.9: Effect of Party Turnover on Dropout Rate 3 Years After Election
Dependent variable: Overall dropout rate in 2011
5% window 3% window Cubic, 25% window
Party turnover 0.9074** 0.8460** 0.5817** 0.6029*** 0.7615* 0.7181*
(0.4015) (0.3931) (0.2246) (0.1981) (0.3974) (0.3940)
Observations 2,427 2,427 1,539 1,539 9,198 9,198
Clusters 538 538 316 316 1789 1789
Control group mean 2.195 2.195 1.999 1.999 2.193 2.193
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: The outcome variable is the percentage of students in the school that dropped out during 2011. The lag
of the outcome variable in 2007 is included as a control. Controls are: years of schooling at the municipal level,
per capita GDP in 2007, share of population that received Bolsa Familia in 2007, unemployment rate in 2007,
whether the school is in an urban or rural area, number of teachers in the school in 2007, whether the school
counts with water pipes, sewer pipes, office for the principal, computer lab, and bathroom inside the school,
proportion of students that have a computer, that live with both parents, that work, that have a car, that observe
their mother reading. Only municipal schools are included. Errors are clustered at the municipality level.
This does not mean that education in Brazil is spiraling down; in fact, performance of students in Brazil as
a whole has improved during the 2000’s according to IDEB (dice de Desenvolvimento da Educa Bca, measured
by INEP). It may well be the case that overall education quality is improving in Brazil over time; however,
within the subset of municipalities with close elections, party turnover decreases students’ performance, when
compared to municipalities without party turnover.
Students in Brazil spend at least 8 years in primary school.10 This means that during their time in school,
they will be exposed to a post-election year from 1 to 3 times. Our results show that most students in the
municipal system are likely to experience a decrease in the quality of their education at some point. These
results work against the hypothesis that the new party is generating changes in the education system with the
objective of improving the quality of education, unless one is willing to believe that these changes systematically
fail to generate benefits during most of the mandate. Alternatively, the improvements could take more than
10The length of primary school varies between 8 and 9 years.
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three years to be realized. Given that elections are held every four years, one wonders whether those benefits
realize at all. We believe that a more plausible explanation is that the negative effect on students’ performance
is a by-product of the use of school positions for patronage.
2.6 Mechanisms
So far we have shown that party turnover leads to higher turnover of teachers, higher turnover of headmasters,
and lower performance of students. It could be argued that party turnover is affecting the quality of education
for reasons other than the increase in turnover of school employees. In this section we test for other mechanisms
that could account for the decrease in students’ performance. We do not find evidence supporting that these
other mechanisms are driving our results; instead, we find evidence suggesting that political turnover creates
malfunctions within the school that are related to teachers and headmasters.
2.6.1 Teachers’ characteristics do not change
Teacher turnover may affect test scores and dropout rates not through the disruption that this change entails, but
because the new teachers are worse teachers. To assess the likelihood of this explanation, we test for differences
in teachers’ characteristics that are related to their ability to teach effectively. Table 2.10 shows the effect of
turnover on teachers’ characteristics such as age, education, and experience. The final pool of teachers is similar,
at least in terms of observables: none of the characteristics are statistically different. Therefore, this explanation
for the decrease in education quality is unlikely.
The increase in teacher turnover could have been the result of an attempt to improve the quality of education
in the longer run. For example, the new mayor could have promoted the replacement of some teachers for more
qualified ones even though, at the end of the day, it did not translate into better educational outcomes. Since
research shows that identifying good teachers at the hiring stage is not straightforward (Staiger and Rockoff
2010; Rockoff et al. 2011), characteristics such as education level or experience are often used by officials as
proxies for quality. Therefore, an attempt to improve the quality of municipal education would be reflected in a
change of observable characteristics. The fact that teachers are similar in terms of observables suggests that
other reasons drive the increase in teachers’ turnover.
2.6.2 Student composition does not change
It is possible that the deterioration of education quality is purely driven by new political parties systematically
broadening education access to students from disadvantageous backgrounds. If that is indeed the case, the
decrease in test score should not be interpreted as a decrease in the quality of education but as reflecting an
underlying change in the composition of students. We test in Table 2.11 whether the socioeconomic composition
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Table 2.10: Effect of Party Turnover on Teachers’ Characteristics
Characteristics of Final Pool of Teachers
Age Educ Female Experience 1 school Tenured
5% window (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Party turnover -0.0278 -0.0300 -0.0189* 0.0197 0.0499 0.0055
(0.3310) (0.0536) (0.0100) (0.0296) (0.0384) (0.0589)
Observations 2,705 2,705 2,705 1,743 1,738 1,733
Clusters 557 557 557 489 487 488
Control group mean 37.29 13.23 0.854 0.170 0.585 0.663
Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO
Party turnover -0.0418 -0.0176 -0.0188** 0.0065 0.0537 0.0057
(0.3045) (0.0494) (0.0094) (0.0297) (0.0362) (0.0526)
Observations 2,296 2,296 2,296 1,735 1,730 1,725
Clusters 532 532 532 482 480 481
Control group mean 37.57 13.28 0.863 0.170 0.585 0.662
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: This table reports the coefficient of "party turnover" from our main specifications. Teachers’ characteristics
are measured in 2009. Columns 1-3 compare the characteristics of teachers new in 2009 (with respect to 2007).
Columns 4-6 compare the characteristics of teachers that left in 2009 (with respect to 2007). Columns 7-12
compare the characteristics of the final pool of teachers in 2009. The lag of the outcome variable in 2007 is
included as a control for column 7-12. Controls are: years of schooling at the municipal level, per capita GDP in
2007, share of population that received Bolsa Familia in 2007, unemployment rate in 2007, whether the school is
in an urban or rural area, number of teachers in the school in 2007, whether the school counts with water pipes,
sewer pipes, office for the principal, computer lab, and bathroom inside the school, proportion of students that
have a computer, that live with both parents, that work, that have a car, that observe their mother reading. Only
teachers in municipal schools are included. Errors are clustered at the municipality level.
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of students taking the exam is different in 2009.
Students are slightly more likely to be male, which would work against our findings since female students
are found to do better in general. All other coefficients are statistically insignificant, suggesting that the decrease
in test scores is not driven by a policy that broadens the access to education or any other force that would
change the composition of students. Moreover, this result also works against the hypothesis that the increase in
dropout rates leads to a different pool of students, which in turn explains the decrease in test scores.
2.6.3 Resources dedicated to education do not change
When the new party takes office, it may go through a learning process regarding the management of the
municipality, the acquisition of funds from the federal and state governments, or the generation of revenue
from its tax base. These adjustments could impact the amount of resources dedicated to education, and thus
generate the observed decrease in test scores and the increase in dropout rates. However, we see in Table 2.12
that the share of resources allocated to education is similar with turnover and reelection. Moreover, we do not
find differences in the transfers received from the national or state government, which would signal differences
in the ability of the new party to raise funds.
2.6.4 Malfunctions within the school
The turnover of teachers and headmaster could be generating management problems within the school. Table
2.13 reports the effect of turnover on the characteristics of headmasters. Indeed, consistent with this management
story, we see that headmasters are less likely to have experience in the position of headmaster (in any school),
but are otherwise similar.
According to anecdotal accounts, headmasters are often teachers that have been in the education system
for a long time, and are now being promoted or elected to headmaster positions. Furthermore, we observe
more negative reports from teachers in regards to their respective headmasters. Table 2.14 shows the effect of
party turnover on the response of teachers to questions about the headmaster, such as "From 1 to 5 (where
1 means to strongly disagree, and 5 means to strongly agree), how much do you trust the headmaster?" We
find that in municipalities with turnover, the perception of teachers about the headmaster are generally worse.
Recall that teachers also have higher turnover in treated municipalities, thus this change in perception could be
a combination of the opinion of teachers about the new headmaster and the opinion of new teachers about
the headmaster of the school where they were transferred. Either way, this result suggests that the turnover
of teachers and headmasters is hurting the relationship between them and, hence, their performance and
effectiveness in the school.
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Table 2.12: Effect of Party Turnover on Municipal Resources
5% window (1) (2) (3)
Share of budget Federal transfers State transfers
spent on education capita per capita
Party turnover 0.0206 0.0103 1.4220 1.2247 -2.1456 -2.0975
(0.0237) (0.0216) (3.2847) (3.3300) (1.8920) (2.5497)
Observations 6,415 1,311 6,247 1,281 6,247 1,281
Clusters 517 364 510 360 510 360
Control group mean 0.572 0.572 2.348 3.485 2.091 2.431
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: This table reports the coefficient of "party turnover" from our main specifications. Outcomes are measured
in 2009. The lag of the outcome variable in 2007 is included as a control. Controls are: years of schooling at the
municipal level, per capita GDP in 2007, share of population that received Bolsa Familia in 2007, unemployment
rate in 2007, whether the school is in an urban or rural area, number of teachers in the school in 2007, whether
the school counts with water pipes, sewer pipes, office for the principal, computer lab, and bathroom inside the
school, proportion of students that have a computer, that live with both parents, that work, that have a car, that
observe their mother reading. Errors are robust.
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2.7 Robustness checks
We have already shown that the results are robust to controlling for characteristics of the municipalities, schools,
and students. We have also shown that results are robust to the use of a 3% window, or a cubic specification
over the 25% window. It could still be argued that the identity of the winning parties accounts for the effects
observed. The 2008 municipal elections were particularly good for the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, left wing)
and the Partido do Movimento Democrco Brasileiro (PMDB, centrist). The PT saw a 36.1% increase in the number of
municipalities under their control (from 410 to 558), and the increase was 13.8% for PMDB (from 1060 to 1207).
On the flip side, the Democractas (DEM, right wing) and Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB, centrist)
lost 36.9% (from 794 to 501) and 9.4% (from 870 to 788) of the municipalities, respectively. More generally,
Brazilian municipalities experienced a shift to the left. In order to check whether we are capturing effects of the
identity of the parties involved or their ideologies, we re-estimate our main specification for all our outcomes
with different controls for party identity and ideology. Table 2.15 shows the coefficient of party turnover on our
main outcome variables, after including fixed effects for party identity of the winner or the incumbent, ideology
(left, center, right) of the winner or the incumbent party, a dummy for whether the incumbent or winning party
runs at the national level, and a measure of the ideological distance between the party in power before and the
party in power after the election. In all cases our results remain significant, and their magnitudes are statistically
similar to the ones reported before.11Therefore, our turnover variable does not seem to be capturing ideology or
party effects.
Table 2.15: Robustness of the Results to Party Identity and Ideology
Fixed Effects on:
5% window
Coef. Party identity Ideology Runs at national
Party level Ideological
Turn.: Winner Incumbent Winner Incumbent Winner Incumbent change
Head turnover 0.2135*** 0.2388*** 0.2460*** 0.2473*** 0.2482*** 0.2547*** 0.2536***
(0.0800) (0.0810) (0.0829) (0.0820) (0.0817) (0.0792) (0.0805)
Obs. 2,290 2,290 2,290 2,290 2,290 2,290 2,290
Clusters 481 481 481 481 481 481 481
Teacher exit 0.0920*** 0.0975*** 0.0991*** 0.0954*** 0.0896*** 0.0993*** 0.0995***
(0.0336) (0.0300) (0.0344) (0.0319) (0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0328)
Obs. 2,705 2,705 2,705 2,705 2,705 2,705 2,705
Clusters 557 557 557 557 557 557 557
Teacher hired 0.1273** 0.1480** 0.1561** 0.1637** 0.1536** 0.1688** 0.1495**
(0.0611) (0.0664) (0.0732) (0.0664) (0.0617) (0.0686) (0.0714)
Obs. 2,705 2,705 2,705 2,705 2,705 2,705 2,705
Clusters 557 557 557 557 557 557 557
11Including municipality, schools, and students controls do not change these results.
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Table 2.15: Robustness of the Results to Party Identity and Ideology (continued)
Fixed Effects on:
5% window
Coef. Party identity Ideology Runs at national
Party level Ideological
Turn.: Winner Incumbent Winner Incumbent Winner Incumbent change
Net change 0.0353 0.0505 0.0570 0.0683 0.0640 0.0696 0.0501
(0.0536) (0.0600) (0.0640) (0.0582) (0.0533) (0.0610) (0.0618)
Obs. 2,705 2,705 2,705 2,705 2,705 2,705 2,705
Clusters 557 557 557 557 557 557 557
Scores 4th gr -0.1394*** -0.1128* -0.1512** -0.1390** -0.1364** -0.1338** -0.1327**
(0.0515) (0.0574) (0.0606) (0.0573) (0.0589) (0.0579) (0.0582)
Obs. 107,016 107,016 107,016 107,016 107,016 107,016 107,016
Clusters 499 499 499 499 499 499 499
Scores 8th gr -0.1236** -0.0797 -0.1164* -0.0893 -0.0899 -0.0875 -0.0874
(0.0559) (0.0550) (0.0614) (0.0591) (0.0634) (0.0608) (0.0613)
Obs. 35,459 35,459 35,459 35,459 35,459 35,459 35,459
Clusters 292 292 292 292 292 292 292
Dropout rate 0.9553** 0.7382* 0.9157** 0.8573* 0.8549* 0.8916** 0.8657**
(0.4072) (0.4205) (0.4113) (0.4422) (0.4355) (0.4413) (0.4207)
Obs. 2,452 2,452 2,452 2,452 2,452 2,452 2,452
Clusters 536 536 536 536 536 536 536
Notes: This table reports the coefficient of party turnover on our main local linear specification after including
different sets of controls for party identity and ideology. Each column has a different set of controls: fixed
effects for party identity, party ideology (left, center, right), and whether the party runs at the national level,
for incumbent or winning party. The last column controls for ideological distance between winning party and
incumbent party. This distance can take values between -2 and 2, where -2 corresponds to the change from right
to left and 2 corresponds to the change from left to right; milder changes take intermediate values (e.g. from
center to left takes value -1). The lag of the corresponding outcome variable in 2007 is included as a control.
Errors are clustered at the municipality level.
2.8 Effect of party turnover on all municipal employees
In this section, we broaden the scope and look for the effect of party turnover on appointments at the municipal
government as a whole. If new parties use government positions to reward supporters, this is likely to happen
in other sectors as well. Table 2.16 shows the effect of party turnover on the share of employees that entered
and exited the bureaucracy in 2009 (defined with respect to the total number of employees in 2007, since 2008 is
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an election year).12
Table 2.16: Effect of Party Turnover on Bureaucrats Turnover
Total from Pooling January - December 2009
5% window (1) (2) (3)
Bureaucrats new in Bureaucrats that left Net change
the position (share) the position (share)
Party turnover 0.1164*** 0.1146** -0.0085 -0.0044 0.1292*** 0.1225***
(0.0450) (0.0453) (0.0308) (0.0308) (0.0451) (0.0455)
Observations 587 587 587 587 587 587
Control group mean 0.416 0.416 0.315 0.315 0.0519 0.0519
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
3% window
Party turnover 0.0879*** 0.0844*** -0.0172 -0.0162 0.0968*** 0.0915***
(0.0283) (0.0291) (0.0188) (0.0198) (0.0279) (0.0287)
Observations 344 344 344 344 344 344
Control group mean 0.390 0.390 0.300 0.300 0.0496 0.0496
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Cubic, 25% window
Party turnover 0.0882** 0.0857** -0.0173 -0.0205 0.1170*** 0.1144***
(0.0426) (0.0423) (0.0295) (0.0294) (0.0420) (0.0420)
Observations 1954 1952 1954 1,975 1954 1,976
Control group mean 0.398 0.398 0.322 0.322 0.0386 0.0386
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: The outcome in column 1 is the share of bureaucrats that start working in a new position during 2009,
where the denominator is the total number of bureaucrats in 2007. The outcome in column 2 is the same, but
for bureaucrats that left a position during 2009. The outcome of column 3 is just the share that entered minus
the share that left a position in the municipality. The lag of the outcome variable (in 2007) is included as a
control. Controls are: years of schooling at the municipal level, per capita GDP in 2007, share of population that
received Bolsa Familia in 2007, unemployment rate in 2007. Errors are robust.
Indeed, hiring is larger in municipalities where a new party took office: the share of new employees
12Using the log of share of employees who enter and exit the bureaucracy yields similar results.
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is 11 percentage points higher. There is no corresponding increase in the number of employees leaving the
government, leading to a net increase in the size of the bureaucracy. For the average municipality, this is an
increase of approximately 60 employees.
One could argue that bureaucrats who leave may do so before the new party takes office. We estimate
(not reported) the effect of turnover on accumulated hiring and exit since November 2008 (the month after the
election), and results are not different. We also do not find differences in the results if we estimate the effect for
2009 and 2010, which means that the number of bureaucrats does not bounce back for at least two years. Figure
2.9 shows the discontinuity in hiring that takes place when there is party turnover, corroborating the causal
interpretation of our results. Moreover, the increase in hiring happens right after the new party takes office,
which indicates that it is indeed driven by the occurrence of party turnover.
Figure 2.9: Effect of Party Turnover on Bureaucrats Hired
Notes: The share of employees hired was calculated over the total number of municipal employees in 2007.
The share of employees hired in 2007 was used as a control.
In Figure 2.10 we separately estimate our main specification month by month, and plot the estimated
coefficients on party turnover. The estimates from before the election took place serve as a placebo, and show
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that we are not capturing pre-trends or seasonal effects. The estimated increase of the bureaucracy is consistent
with calculations made by IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Econmica Aplicada), which report a 35% growth of
municipal employment between 2003 and 2010.
Figure 2.10: Bureaucrats Hired Over Time
Notes: In order to construct this figure, we estimated our main specification separately for the share of
bureaucrats hired month by month. The figure reports the corresponding estimated coefficients and 95%
confidence intervals. The lag of the outcome variable (in 2007) is included as a control. Errors are robust.
In sum, we find that party turnover not only affects teachers and headmasters but also disrupts the
municipal bureaucracy more generally. We thus believe that the increase in turnover at the school level is a
reflection of a more general phenomenon occurring in municipal governments, in which new parties bring new
people to work in the government; the main difference is that the number of positions at the school level is
naturally restricted (e.g. there cannot be more than one headmaster per school), which constrains the margin of
increase.
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2.9 Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to study the effect of party turnover on bureaucrats’ turnover and the consequences
for the delivery of public services. To this end, we focus on close municipal elections in Brazil. We find that
party turnover leads to an increase in turnover of teachers and headmasters and, more generally, an increase in
the size of the bureaucracy, consistent with patronage practices. For the case of education, we find that test
scores are lower and dropout rates are higher in municipalities where a new party takes office. Competing
explanations such as changes in the characteristics of teachers or students, or changes in resources allocated
to schools do not seem to account for our results. Instead, we find that headmasters are less experienced and
teachers are more negative about the performance of the headmaster. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the
disruption to the bureaucracy is not innocuous.
Elections are a tool for citizens to remove politicians that do not serve them well. While the threat of
removal may be good for performance, this paper shows that its execution may bring costs that these political
institutions were intending to avoid. However, our results do not imply that term limits or political turnover
are intrinsically harmful for the economy. They rather emphasize one reason for coupling them with proper
protection of civil servants, in order to isolate basic government functions from political transitions. Protection
of civil servants has traditionally been achieved by the use of tenure regimes, which poses a serious dilemma
for the design of public institutions, since tenure deprives workers from incentives to perform. We believe that a
better understanding of this tension, and of potential solutionst for it, is key for our understanding of the limits
and determinants of state capacity.
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Chapter 3
Fixing Broken Windows: The Effect of
Government Maintenance Work on
Citizens’ Complaints
3.1 Introduction
Quality of government is key for economic development. Governments are central in generating the conditions
for bottom-up economic growth and non-monetary welfare through the provision of public goods and services.
Citizens’ political participation is widely regarded to be an important determinant of government representa-
tiveness and effectiveness (World Development Report 2004). However, less is known about the direct feedback
effect from quality of government to citizens’ participation. This paper is concerned with the following question:
do citizens participate more when they face a better government?
I provide evidence on the impact of quality of government on citizens’ political participation in a particular
setting: government maintenance work of public space and citizens’ complaints. I use a unique dataset with
detailed information on citizens’ complaints about and government maintenance of sidewalks, streets, trees,
and streetlights in the City of Buenos Aires. The information was recorded at the city block-level between
November 2012 and July 2013. The question is whether citizens are more likely to complain about problems in
a given block when they observe the government working nearby. I argue that the contingencies associated
with the execution of maintenance work generates plausible exogenous variation of repairs over time, and thus
exploit within-block variation in order to identify the effect of repairs on complaints. I present several test for
the plausibility of this assumption.
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There are three reasons why this context is nicely suited to study the relevance of government effectiveness
on participation. First, information asymmetries are not a constraint for citizens: residents are better informed
than the government about the condition of the public space. Second, and related, it is easy for residents to
observe this type of government work. Third, the cost of filing a complaint is unlikely to constitute a significant
barrier to participation.
I find that government work stimulates citizens’ participation. For a given block, the existence of government
work nearby increases the likelihood of new complaints between 1.2 and 1.5 percentage points (4.6% to 5.7%
with respect to blocks without repairs nearby).1 Several pieces of evidence suggest that differential pre-trends
or reverse causality do not drive this result: first, results are robust to including area and neighborhood
trends; second, leads for repairs nearby are not significant predictors of complaints at time t; third, repairs that
address notifications other than contemporaneous complaints still have an effect on current complaints. Fourth,
repairs during month t are positively associated with complaints filed during the last week of month t but not
with complaints filed during the first week of that month. Finally, complaints solved during month t predict
complaints during the first week of month t+ 1. Reassuringly, visibility of repairs (both in terms of size of the
work and public good involved) also predicts new complaints, and there also are spillovers from repairs in one
public good to complaints about other public goods.
The increase in participation seems to be driven by a change in fundamental parameters of the decision-
making process, as opposed to merely reflecting a shift in attention toward problems in the public space. I use
repairs performed by utility service companies (water, electricity, etc.), which typically involve interventions in
sidewalks and streets. Contrary to previous results, complaints do not respond to these interventions in the
public space, although they would also drive citizens’ attention to problems in the area. The relevant parameter
seems to be an updated perception of government responsiveness: repairs that address past reports from
citizens or citizens’ representatives (as opposed to those coming from other sources) have the largest impact.
This result still holds after adjusting for a measure of the size of the problem.
A growing literature on the determinants of citizens’ participation and, more broadly, social capital
has found individual, community, and institutional characteristics that predict the level of participation in
community and political life. At the individual level, more educated citizens are more likely to be active (Verba
and Nie 1987; Verba et al. 1995; Besley, Pande and Rao 2005; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998). Botero, Ponce and
Shleifer (2013) argue that the positive relationship between education and quality of government is mediated
by the fact that more educated citizens complain more, which in turn incentivizes the government to perform.
Gender is also relevant for participation (Bratton 1999; Besley, Pande and Rao 2005; Giné and Mansuri 2011), and
social capital is higher for citizens with more income (Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote 2002). At the community
level, cultural aspect such as family ties predict the degree of civic engagement and political participation
1I focus on blocks that do not have repairs on a given month, in order to avoid direct effects of those repairs
on complaints
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(Alesina and Giuliano 2011). Moreover, in the US, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) find that inequality and ethnic
fragmentation are negatively related to participation in associational activities. Consistent with this result,
Banerjee et al. (N.d.) finds that informational campaigns discouraging voting along caste lines increase voter
turnout.
This paper is closest to the work that focuses on the impact of political institutions and their functioning.
The institutional context can directly determine the costs and benefits from participation. Political violence
is a deterrent of participation (Collier and Vicente 2014), whereas fines for abstention and vote buying seem
to encourage it (León 2013; Vicente 2014). The functioning of institutions can also set expectations about the
efficacy of taking actions. Information about political corruption is found to push voters to withdraw from
the political process (Chong et al. 2012), whereas information about the performance and qualifications of
politicians, programatic campaigns coupled with voter feedback on platforms, and campaigns to raise awareness
about the relevance of the electoral process for policy increases voter turnout (Banerjee et al. 2011; Wantchekon
2003; Giné and Mansuri 2011). A more direct measure of the relevance of expectations comes from Botero,
Ponce and Shleifer (2013), who find that citizens’ perceived likelihood of punishment for a policeman violating
the law is a strong predictor of their probability to complain about officials’ misconduct.
This paper addresses the impact of actual government actions and responsiveness on participation, and
provides evidence that is suggestive of concurrent changes in citizens’ expectations. Taken together with the
literature that documents the relevance of social capital for government quality and responsiveness (Putnam,
Leonardi and Nanetti 1994; Goldin and Katz 1999; Knack 2002; Banfield 1967; Björkman, Svensson et al. 2009;
Martinez-Bravo et al. 2011; Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan 2007; Nannicini et al. 2013), it suggests that a
framework that considers the co-determination of culture and institutions may be more appropriate in order to
understand both government performance and citizens’ political engagement.2
Lastly, the results in this paper are akin to the broken windows theory (Wilson and Kelling 1982), which
states that physical manifestations of disorder (i.e., broken windows) promote behavior conducive to more
disorder. In this case, when the government fixes problems, behavior that is conducive to more repairs is
encouraged.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the context and the data used.
Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the main results and possible mechanisms at play.
Section 5 concludes.
2Other papers that looks at the interdependence of culture and institutions are: Carlin, Dorobantu and
Viswanathan (2009); Alesina et al. (2015); Alesina, Cozzi and Mantovan (2012); Alesina and Angeletos (2005);
Acemoglu and Jackson (2015); Aghion et al. (2010).
92
3.2 Context and Data
With 203 km2, 3 million residents, and approximately 4 more million people commuting every day, the City of
Buenos Aires is one of the largest metropolitan areas of South America. As in most big cities, the condition of
the public space is in constant change. Even though citizens can complain to the government about a range of
problems, from corruption to streetlights to school infrastructure, most complaints are related to problems in
the public space. In this paper, I will focus on complaints and maintenance work on streets, sidewalks, trees,
and streetlights, since the work executed for those public goods has high volume and is better recorded.
Traditionally, citizens filed complaints directly to the corresponding office (e.g., a request for tree pruning
would be filed at the tree maintenance office), where it was decided whether to address them or dismiss them.
Information about complaints was not shared with other areas, resulting in low accountability within the
government regarding the degree of responsiveness to citizens. The administration that won the elections in
2007 decided to give a larger role to citizens’ requests in the determination of government work in the public
space. A process of centralization and digitization of all complaints started in 2007, which dramatically increase
their visibility within the government. In 2007, the government set up a call center to receive all complaints, in
2009 it added a website for citizens to file complaints online, and in 2012 it also incorporated mobile applications.
All the complaints obtained through these channels are first registered in a single dataset, and then redirected
to the corresponding government area.
Figure 3.1 depicts the increased focus of government work on complaints between November 2012 and July
2013. Even though the total number of repairs does not have any clear trend during this period, the shift of
repairs toward problems reported by citizens is apparent. Within seven months, the share of repairs that were
linked to a complaint went from 15% to 65%, that is, it more than quadruplicate. This increase reflects a change
in the choices about what work to do and also a better registration of the match between work and existing
complaints, both reflecting the growing interest in addressing citizens’ complaints.
The shift in attention toward citizens’ complaints was met with a growing demand for government work.
Figure 3.2 shows the upward trend for the number of complaints: in two years, from the beginning of 2012 to
the end of 2013, it almost duplicated. Although the government lowered the cost to complain by opening new
(online) channels of communication, most of this increase came from the intensification of complaints over the
phone, consistent with an increasingly demanding citizenry.
3.2.1 Organization of government work
The City of Buenos Aires is geographically divided into fifteen administrative areas, and the maintenance of
each public good is managed by a separate government office. The government does not typically execute
the work, but it has contractors for each public good and area. For sidewalks, streets, and trees, each of these
contractors have contracts that determine an overall budget, and the prices for each possible task that they could
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Figure 3.1: Problems Fixed Over Time
Notes: Above the horizontal line, the figure displays the total number of repairs in the City of
Buenos Aires per month in the panel. Only repairs about street, sidewalks, trees, and streetlights are
included. Below the horizontal line, the figure displays the share of those repairs that are addressing
a complaint, that is: (complaints repaired)/(total repairs)
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Figure 3.2: Complaints Over Time
Notes: This figure displays the total number of complaints per month, between January 2011 and
October 2013. Only complaints about street, sidewalks, trees, and streetlights are included.
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perform. For streetlights, the contract stipulates a fix price per public light maintained.
Figure 3.3 describes the main steps for how the government organizes the maintenance work. First, the
government receives and creates notifications. Citizens’ complaints account for 40% of the notifications; other
sources include government officials, requests from other institutions, requests from citizens’ representatives,
and repairs following the work of utility service companies. The corresponding government office generates
work orders based on these notifications and sends them to the contractors, who execute the work orders and
report back to the government office.
Figure 3.3: Organization of Maintenance Work
Even though the geographic distribution of work is affected by complaints, several other factors that do not
depend on the government determine the timing at which the work is executed. First, contractors traditionally
had a great deal of control over the allocation decision and the timing. Even though this has been changing
over time, during this period contractors still retained a good degree of autonomy to decide what to execute
and when. In fact, not all notifications became work orders, and not all work orders were executed: 30%
of notifications created between November and December of 2012 had work orders by July 2013, of which
contractors had only completed 50%. Second, maintenance work is also subjected to weather conditions. No
work can be done with rain, street repairs are constrained by low temperatures, and tree pruning depends
on the season and the species. Third, the sudden emergence of urgent problems (those that pose a threat to
citizens) and the arrival of judicial orders delays the processing of all other work. Lastly, the available budget
determines how much work is performed and its distributions over time. The budget available is affected by
the time of the year and the existence of large infrastructure projects in the City. All in all, the government faced
a complex work process that limited its ability to control the timing at which work would be executed.
3.2.2 Data
I count with panel data for 22,315 blocks over 9 months (November 2012 to July 2013). This data contains three
pieces of information:
• Anonymous information about complaints filed during that period regarding sidewalks, streets, street-
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lights, and trees. Among other things, this data contains the type of problem, the address of the problem,
the day of the report, and the number of reiterations of the complaint. This data was obtained upon
request to the government.
• Information about maintenance work for those public goods during the same period. Among other
things, this data contains other notifications besides complaints, the type of problem reported, location,
dates in the maintenance process (e.g., when the work order was created), and types of tasks executed,.
Even though the exact time of the execution of the work is not registered in this data, I can recover the
month of execution based on the payment to contractors for the work. This data was obtained upon
request to the government.
• Information about the use of land in the City. That is, the number of buildings in each block, the type of
building (house, apartments, commercial, offices, school, etc.), and the number of floors per building.
This data was obtained from the City Government website.
Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of work over the blocks in the sample during the period for which I have
data. Most blocks do not receive repairs, or receive a small number of repairs.
Only 35% of the blocks have 3 or more repairs during this period. The different government offices and
their corresponding contractors normally do not coordinate their work, as reflected in Table 3.1 that shows the
(low) correlation between repairs on different types of public goods on a given month.
Table 3.1: Correlation of Work Across Public Goods on a Given Month
Repairs at t for block b:
Sidewalks Trees Streetlights Streets
Sidewalks 1
Trees 0.0201 1
Streetlights 0.00410 -0.0130 1
Streets 0.00840 0.181 0.00320 1
Notes: This table shows the pairwise correlation across repairs for sidewalks, trees, streets, and streetlights
during the same month and in the same block.
Approximately 10% of the blocks do not register complaints during the period considered, as shown in
Figure 3.5, and the median block registers four complaints during this period.
For each block I compute the share of parcels that have residential buildings (houses or apartments), the
share of parcels with commercial buildings (stores or offices), the share of parcels with other buildings (churches,
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of Repairs Across Blocks
Notes: To create this figure, I first counted the number of repairs during the panel for each block. The
figure shows the distribution of blocks according to the total number of repairs received.
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of Complaints Across Blocks
Notes: To create this figure, I first counted the number of complaints during the panel for each block. The
figure shows the distribution of blocks according to the total number of complaints filed.
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government offices, schools, etc), and the total number of floors in the block, as a measure of the circulation of
people in the block. Table 3.2 describes the characteristics of the blocks based on whether they had complaints,
repairs, and complaints repaired.
Table 3.2: Characteristics of Blocks by Existence of Complaints, Repairs, and Complaints Repaired
Complaints Repairs Complaints s
repaired
0 1+ 0 1+ 0 1+
Share residential buildings 0.481 0.626 0.591 0.624 0.591 0.638
(0.359) (0.266) (0.315) (0.261) (0.297) (0.255)
Share comercial buildings 0.313 0.286 0.285 0.289 0.295 0.281
(0.314) (0.235) (0.269) (0.231) (0.256) (0.227)
Share other buildings 0.205 0.0881 0.124 0.0874 0.114 0.0813
(0.308) (0.141) (0.218) (0.136) (0.192) (0.127)
Density (total number of floors) 15.83 34.30 27.02 35.03 30.04 35.58
(19.34) (26.63) (25.54) (26.66) (26.40) (26.50)
Block in high income area 0.398 0.502 0.464 0.502 0.497 0.484
(0.490) (0.500) (0.499) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Previous complaints not solved 1.643 5.255 3.397 5.513 3.878 5.950
(2.162) (4.107) (3.470) (4.185) (3.638) (4.293)
Notes: This table reports characteristics of the blocks, according to whether they have received at least one
complaint, at least one repair, and at least one complain repaired on a given month. The first three characteristics
are the share of parcels in the block occupied with residential buildings (houses or apartments), comercial
buildings (shops or offices), and other buildings (government buildings, churches, empty parcels, sport clubs,
etc). Density is a variable that counts the total number of floors in the block. That is, if the block has 5 building
with 3 floors and 5 buildings with 8 floors, this variable takes value 5*3+5*8 = 55. Block in high income area
takes value 1 if the block is in an area that has income above the median for the city, and 0 otherwise. Previous
complaints not solved is the sum of all complaints opened in the block between January 1st 2012 and the last
month, that do not have a repair associated up to that point. The table displays the average and standard
deviation (in parenthesis) for each of these characteristics, for each of the subgroups described at the beginning
of this note.
Complaints are more common in higher income areas (blocks with complaints are in high income areas 50%
of the time and blocks without complaints are in high income areas 39.8% of the time), in areas with residential
buildings (an average of 62% of the block is residential, versus 48% in cases without complaints), in blocks with
less predominance of other buildings (an average of 8.8% of the block has other buildings, versus 20.5% in cases
without complaints) and in blocks with more circulation of people (an average of 34.4 floors in the block, versus
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15.8 floors in cases without complaints). Moreover, complaints on a given month are more common in blocks
with a larger stock of previous complaints unsolved. Blocks with at least one repair or at least one complaint
repaired have similar characteristics.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
The objective is to estimate the causal effect of government maintenance work in the public space on the number
of complaints by citizens. In order to avoid unobservable characteristics of the block that could correlate repairs
and complaints, such as severity of the problems or neighbors’ propensity to complain, I exploit variation over
time at the block level. Let Nb be the pair of blocks contiguous to block b. That is, if b = {Astrada 2200-2299}
(where Astrada is the name of the street), then Nb = {Astrada 2100-2199; Astrada 2300-2399}3. The main
specification is:
Cbt = a+ bRNbt + block.dummies+ time.dummies+ #bt (3.1)
where Cbt is an indicator that takes value 1 if there are new complaints at time t for problems in block b,
RNbt is an indicator that takes value 1 if there are repairs on Nb at time t, and b is the coefficient of interest. I
look at repairs on Nb because those blocks are the most visible ones from block b, and focus on indicators of
repairs and complaints (as opposed to quantities) because this specification is more robust to any underlying
heterogeneity or misspecification.4 Government work can affect complaints in several ways: first, the more
repairs, the fewer the remaining problems to complain about; second, the repair itself may be faulty, generating
new problems and complaints; and third, a repair can convey information to citizens about the government.
Since I am interested in the third channel, I focus on the effect of repairs nearby in order to isolate the effect of
observing repairs, while keeping constant the stock of problems to complain about at block b.
However, b could capture differential trends for blocks that observed and did not observe repairs at time t.
Figure 3.6 compares the trends for these two groups. The dashed line shows the evolution of the likelihood
of complaints for blocks that had repairs nearby, with the horizontal axis redefined to be centered around the
time of the repair. The solid line is a weighted average of the likelihood of complaints in blocks without repairs
nearby, where the weights replicate the relevance of each month t for the construction of the treatment averages.
In all cases, blocks experiencing repairs at t = 0 are excluded in order to avoid the direct effects of the repairs
described before.
Figure 3.6 shows that repairs are allocated to areas where complaining is generally higher, in line with the
3Blocks in the City of Buenos Aires are typically 100 meters long, comprise 100 numbers, and start at the
multiples of 100.
4Results using number of repairs and/or number of complaints yields similar results
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Figure 3.6: Pre-Trends in Likelihood of Complaints
Notes: This figure compares the likelihood of new complaints on a given month, for blocks that
had repairs nearby with those that didn’t have repairs nearby. For each block that observed repairs
nearby more than once, I take each occurrence as a separate observation. In order to construct the
treatment line, I define t=0 as the month where the repair nearby happens, and keep only the blocks
that didn’t experience a repair themselves during that month. For each t, I calculate the share of
those blocks that had at least one new complaint, which is the dashed line. In order to construct the
control line, I calculate for each month, the share of blocks that had at least one complaint, among
those that did not have repairs nearby that month. I also calculate for each t (as defined in this figure,
after re-centering) the proportion of observations used for the treatment line that correspond to each
month in the data. I then use these proportions to do a weighted average of the calculated share.
This is the control line.
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attempt of the government to be more responsive. At the same time, the timing does not seem to respond to a
differential increase in complaints in preceding months. That is, blocks with nearby repairs at time t have the
same pre-trend in complaints as the control blocks, which suggests that the fixed effects estimation is unlikely
to pick up pre-existent differences. I also report results for the main specification with up to two leads and lags
of the treatment variable. As a further check, in the regressions I also include controls for linear, quadratic, and
cubic trends at the area and the neighborhood level.
Figure 3.6 also shows that the likelihood of complaints in block b increases during the month of the repair
in Nb, which is consistent with an increase in participation when citizens observe the government working
nearby. However, reverse causality could also account for this finding: in month t the government targets
repairs to some blocks (but not others) in areas that are experiencing a current spike in complaints. There
are two possible sources for a concurrent spike of complaints in nearby blocks. First, the existence of spatial
correlation of problems. Even though contiguous blocks are likely to be similar, it is unlikely that the same
type of problem will suddenly arise on both blocks during the same month. For instance, the lifespan of LED
streetlights is between 50,000 and 100,000 hours; even if they are installed at the same time, the chances are
small that streetlights on contiguous blocks will break during the same month. Moreover, problems that evolve
slowly (such as growing trees) do not provide a natural anchor related to the problem that would drive together
complaints across blocks.
A second possibility is the existence of a change in neighbors’ propensity to complain. I thus empirically
address the reverse causality concern in several ways: first, I use that the date of the complaint is perfectly
recorded to check whether the repairs in month t are associated with complaints at the beginning or at the end
of the month. The existence of reverse causality would predict that the association is stronger in the first case,
and an increase in citizens’ participation as a result of repairs would predict that the association is stronger in
the second case. Second, I divide the effect of repairs into those that address contemporaneous complaints (that
is, complaints filed during the same month) and all other repairs. If reverse causality drives the results, repairs
that do not address contemporaneous complaints will not be relevant.
Third, I check whether the visibility of the problem matters. I use the number of task executed as a measure
of the visibility of the repairs, and I also look at the effect of repairs for public goods with different degrees of
visibility. Moreover, I look for spillovers across different public goods. That is, I check whether (for instance) a
street repair in Nb at time t is associated with a higher likelihood of complaints about sidewalks in b at time t.
As described in the previous section, each type of job has its own set of providers and is managed by different
groups of government officials. For reverse causality to generate any relationship across types of work, spikes
of complaints about one type of work in one block need to be frequently paired with spikes about work 2 in a
nearby block, and the later be quickly solved. However, even in the same block the correlation of complaints for
different types of problems is not very high (although they are positive), as shown in table 3.3.
Lastly, reverse causality could operate over time: citizens complained about problems in Nb (and potentially
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Table 3.3: Correlation of Complaints Across Public Goods on a Given Month
Complaints at t for block b:
Sidewalks Trees Streetlights Streets
Sidewalks 1
Trees 0.165 1
Streetlights 0.0443 0.0722 1
Streets 0.0729 0.0832 0.0247 1
Notes: This table shows the pairwise correlation across complaints for sidewalks, trees, streets, and streetlights
during the same month and in the same block.
b) at t  1 and then continue to complain (at least) about b at time t. If the government replied to the complaints
at time t  1 by fixing them at time t, then we would observe a positive association between complaints and
nearby repairs at t. I thus check how sensitive are the results to including complaints in b and Nb at time t  1
as a control.
3.4 Results
This section presents the main results. Section 4.1 examines the effect of government work on citizens’
participation and robustness checks. Section 4.2 discusses the interpretation of the results found.
3.4.1 Government work increases citizens’ participation
Table 3.4 presents results for the main specification. The existence of at least one repair one block away increases
the likelihood of complaints in block b during the same period in 1.2 percentage points, which corresponds
to an increase of 4.6% with respect to the blocks without repairs nearby (column (1)). This result does not
reflect direct effects of the repairs, as it would be the case if deficient repairs were generating further complaints,
because blocks with contemporaneous repairs are excluded. Past actions from citizens or the government could
potentially introduce a bias in the coefficient of interest, if they generate both complaints in b and repairs in
Nb. For instance, complaints in Nb at time t  1 could be associated both with complaints in b and repairs in
Nb at time t. Therefore, column (2) controls for the number of complaints and repairs during the previous
month, both in block b and in Nb. Results are not significantly affected, suggesting that the positive relationship
between complaints and repairs at t is not driven by past behavior.
Given the rather conservative definition of Nb, these estimates are likely to underestimate the real effect. In
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all these estimations, only contiguous blocks that are on the same street as the repair are considered as treated
because the repairs are most visible from those blocks. In reality, other blocks that are currently considered
control may be partially treated. Moreover, a repair in a given block will increase the likelihood of complaints
on both blocks nearby, and so the impact of the repair is twice this estimation.
Since the source of identification comes from variation over time, Column (3) to (9) include area-specific
trends5 and neighborhood-specific trends. Including linear, quadratic, and cubic trends at either level does
not affect the results, and slightly increase the point estimate to 1.5 percentage points (5.7%). Moreover, Table
3.5 reports results including up to two leads and lags of the treatment variable. Column (1) and (2) show
that neither leads nor lags are significantly associated with new complaints in block b at time t, and that their
inclusion does not affect the coefficient of interest. Leads not only are not significant, but also have a small point
estimate, which provides evidence against the existence of differential pre-trends.
Even if there are no differential pre-trends, this result could simply reflect that the government replies
quickly to areas that experience a spike in complaints. In other words, reverse causality (combined with spatial
correlation) could potentially account for the positive association between repairs in Nb and complaints in b. To
test for the existence of the causal link of interest, I split the sample into repairs that are addressing complaints
opened during the same month and all other repairs. Table 3.6 reports the results of the fixed effects estimation
with repairs split in those two groups.
Reassuringly, repairs that are not addressing contemporaneous complaints significantly predict complaints
during the current month, which points to the existence of a causal link from repairs to complaints. At the same
time, repairs that address contemporaneous complaints in Nb are also associated with an increase in complaints
in b. In principle, this could indicate that both causal links are at play, although a government that addresses
complaints and does so in a very short period of time could have a large impact on citizens’ perceptions. In
order to further explore the existence of reverse causality, I make use of the fact that the date of the complaints
is perfectly recorded and exploit its variation within a month. That is, I separately estimate the impact of repairs
during month t on complaints filed at the beginning and at the end of the month (Panel A, Table 3.7).
Column (1) to (4) reports results for complaints filed during the first week of the month. In all cases the
effect is not significant, and the point estimate is close to zero. At the same time, complaints filed during the
last week of the month are significantly higher when a repair was executed nearby. Column (5) to (8) shows this
result, and its robustness to controls. In the last four columns, I check for within-month variation in complaints.
That is, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes value 1 if the number of complaints filed during the
last week of the month is strictly higher than those filed during the first week, and 0 otherwise. The evidence
indicates that when there are repairs nearby, an increase in complaints in block b during the month is more
likely to happen.
5These are the 15 administrative areas described in section 2.
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Table 3.5: Fixed Effects Estimation Including Leads and Lags
Dummy new complaints Number new complaints
in block b at time t in block b at time t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy repairs Nb, t+2 -0.0048 -0.0085
(0.0053) (0.0097)
Dummy repairs Nb, t+1 0.0011 -0.0056 0.0083 -0.0026
(0.0033) (0.0051) (0.0075) (0.0092)
Dummy repairs Nb, t 0.0145*** 0.0159** 0.0299*** 0.0294**
(0.0045) (0.0062) (0.0084) (0.0111)
Dummy repairs Nb, t-1 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0020 -0.0022
(0.0033) (0.0054) (0.0061) (0.0086)
Dummy repairs Nb, t-2 -0.0014 -0.0037
(0.0048) (0.0068)
No repairs own block, t X X X X
Observations 131,393 92,598 131,393 92,598
R-squared 0.0024 0.0017 0.0032 0.0023
Number of blocks 22,219 22,198 22,219 22,198
Mean control 0.252 0.249 0.364 0.358
Notes: All regressions include month and block fixed effects. "Dummy new complaints in block b at time t" is a
dummy that takes value 1 if there was a new complaint filed in block b at during month t, and 0 otherwise.
"Number new complaints in block b at time t" is the number of complaints opened during month t for block
b. "Dummy repairs Nb, t" is a dummy that takes value 1 if there was a repair in a block near block b during
month t. All regressions exclude blocks that are experiencing repairs at t. Errors are clustered at area level.
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Table 3.6: Effect of Contemporaneous Complaints Repaired vs Other Repairs
Dummy new complaints in block b, time t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy contemp. complaints repaired Nb, t 0.0133** 0.0129** 0.0176*** 0.0175***
(0.0048) (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0058)
Dummy any other repair Nb, t 0.0102** 0.0102** 0.0110** 0.0109**
(0.0039) (0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0047)
No repairs own block, t x x x x
Lag complaints repairs b, Nb x x x
Area trends linear
Neighborhood trends linear
Observations 169,757 151,231 151,231 151,201
R-squared 0.0038 0.0055 0.0068 0.0074
Number of blocks 22,221 22,221 22,221 22,217
Notes: All regressions include month and block fixed effects. "Dummy new complaints in block b at time t" is a
dummy that takes value 1 if there was a new complaint filed in block b at during month t, and 0 otherwise.
"Dummy contemporaneous complaints repaired Nb,t " is a dummy that takes value 1 when there was at least
one repair nearby at t that was solving a complaint opened during t, and 0 otherwise. "Dummy any other
repair Nb, t" is a dummy that takes value 1 if there was at least one repair nearby at t, that is not solving a
complaint opened during t, and 0 otherwise. All regressions exclude blocks that are experiencing repairs at t.
"Lag complaints repairs b, Nb" includes as controls the number of repairs and complaints at t-1 for both block b
and nearby blocks Nb. Linear trends fit a different linear trend per area/neighborhood, including their own
intercept. Errors are clustered at area level.
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Panel B of Table 3.7 replicates the previous exercise, but focusing on repairs that are originated by complaints,
since those are the repairs most likely6 to drive the reverse causality link. Results are similar, providing further
assurance for the interpretation of the previous evidence. Table 3.8 further supports that repairs that address
complaints have a causal effect on further complaints. In this case, I look at the effect of those repairs at time t
on complaints the first week of the month t+ 1 and find a positive link: a complaint repaired at time t in Nb
increases between 6.4 and 9.7 percentage points the likelihood of complaints in block b during the first week of
t+ 1.
Table 3.8: Effect on Complaints Filed During the First Week of Following Month
Dummy new complaints in b, first week t+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy complaints repaired Nb, t 0.0976*** 0.0857*** 0.0643*** 0.0644***
(0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0020) (0.0020)
No repairs own block, t x x x x
Lag complaints repairs b, Nb x x x
Area trends linear
Neighborhood trends linear
Observations 149,919 131,393 131,393 131,367
R-squared 0.0024 0.0049 0.0054 0.0057
Number of blocks 22,219 22,219 22,219 22,215
Notes: All regressions include month and block fixed effects. "Dummy complaints repaired Nb, t" is dummy that
takes value 1 if there was a complaint repaired in a block near block b during month t. "Dummy new complaints
in block b, first week t+1" is a dummy that takes value 1 if there was at least one complaint open in block b
during the first 7 days of month t+1, and 0 otherwise. All regressions exclude blocks that are experiencing
repairs at t. "Lag complaints repairs b, Nb" includes as controls the number of repairs and complaints at t-1 for
both block b and nearby blocks Nb. Linear trends fit a different linear trend per area/neighborhood, including
their own intercept. Errors are clustered at area level.
In addition, more visible repairs have a larger effect. Each repairs is subdivided into tasks that are pre-
defined in the contract signed by the provider, and are the same for all providers involved. For instance,
6Since some of the administrative systems used by the government were relatively new, sometimes repairs
that addressed citizens’ reports were not directly linked to the corresponding complaint but with a new internal
notification.
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repairing a sidewalk could include the tasks of "construction of subfloor with 12cm of thickness", "construction
of internal planter", and "tile laying". A given repair specifies which tasks were executed, and how many times.
Therefore, the number of tasks is a measure of the visibility of the repair that combines both its size and its
length of execution. Table 3.9 includes the number of tasks executed, and finds that not only the existence of
repairs matters, but the visibility of the job (defined as above) also has an impact on complaints.
Table 3.9: Effect of Visibility of Repairs, Defined as Number of Tasks Executed
Dummy new complaints in block b at time t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy repairs Nb, t 0.0078** 0.0080** 0.0110** 0.0109**
(0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0038)
Number of tasks Nb, t 0.0008** 0.0009** 0.0008** 0.0008*
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
No repairs own block, t x x x x
Lag complaints repairs b, Nb x x x
Area trends linear
Neighborhood trends linear
Observations 169,757 151,231 151,231 151,201
R-squared 0.0038 0.0052 0.0064 0.0070
Number of blocks 22,221 22,221 22,221 22,217
Notes: All regressions include month and block fixed effects. "Dummy repairs Nb, t" is dummy that takes value
1 if there was a repair in a block near block b during month t. "Number of tasks Nb, t" is the number of tasks
executed during month t in blocks near block b. "Dummy new complaints in block b at time t" is a dummy
that takes value 1 if there was at least one complaint open in block b during month t, and 0 otherwise. All
regressions exclude blocks that are experiencing repairs at t. "Lag complaints repairs b, Nb" includes as controls
the number of repairs and complaints at t-1 for both block b and nearby blocks Nb. Linear trends fit a different
linear trend per area/neighborhood, including their own intercept. Errors are clustered at area level.
Another way of measuring the relevance of the visibility of government work is related to the type of
public good being repaired. The dataset contains complaints and repairs for the four most important public
goods maintained by the city government: trees, sidewalks, streets, and streetlights. Changes in sidewalks and
streetlights are typically more noticeable for residents than changes in trees or streets. Table 3.10 separates the
effect of repairs by type of public good involved Column (1) shows that the increase in complaints is driven
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by fixing sidewalks and streetlights, but streets and trees do not have a significant effect, consistent with the
previous result. Fixing sidewalks increases the likelihood of complaints by approximately 3.1 percentage points
(11.9%), and fixing streetlights by approximately 0.95 percentage points (3.6%). Column (2) to (5) focus on
complaints for each public good separately. Repairs of one public good are not necessarily associated with more
complaints for that same public good (which is the most direct implication of reverse causality), but oftentimes
with complaints about other public goods.
Table 3.10: Effect of Repairs, by Type of Public Good
Dummy new complaints in block b at time t
All Trees Sidewalks Streets Streetlights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dummy repairs trees Nb, t -0.0001 0.0029 0.0008 -0.0014 -0.0005
(0.0058) (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0026)
Dummy repairs sidewalks Nb, t 0.0312*** 0.0226*** 0.0327*** 0.0054 -0.0006
(0.0071) (0.0045) (0.0065) (0.0033) (0.0020)
Dummy repair street Nb, t 0.0109 0.0053 0.0002 0.0074** 0.0001
(0.0071) (0.0036) (0.0044) (0.0030) (0.0047)
Dummy repairs streetlights Nb, t 0.0095** 0.0084* 0.0014 0.0059*** -0.0052
(0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0025) (0.0015) (0.0038)
No repairs own block, t x x x x x
Observations 169,757 169,757 169,757 169,757 169,757
R-squared 0.0039 0.0015 0.0020 0.0008 0.0186
Number of blocks 22,221 22,221 22,221 22,221 22,221
Mean control 0.262 0.125 0.0859 0.0402 0.0717
Notes: All regressions include month and block fixed effects. "Dummy new complaints in block b at time t"
is a dummy that takes value 1 if there was a new complaint filed in block b during month t, and 0 otherwise.
Column (1) looks at any complaint, whereas column (2) to (5) only look at complaints regarding trees, sidewalks,
streets, and streetlights respectively. "Dummy repairs trees Nb, t" is a dummy that takes value 1 if there was a
repair of a tree in a block near block b during month t, and 0 otherwise. Variables for sidewalks, street, and
streetlights are defined in the same way. All regressions exclude blocks that are experiencing any repair at t.
"Lag complaints repairs b, Nb" includes as controls the number of repairs and complaints at t-1 for both block b
and nearby blocks Nb, separately for each public good. Errors are clustered at area level.
In sum, the evidence indicates that government work does stimulate citizens participation: repairing
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problems in a block generates an increase in citizens’ complaints in nearby blocks. Does this imply a change in
citizens’ perception about the government, or it simply captures a shift in attention towards problems in the
public space? In the next section, I present evidence that aims at distinguishing among potential stories behind
this result.
3.4.2 Interpretation
There are two big categories of explanations for the result found so far. On the one hand, citizens may become
more active because the repairs convey information about the expected value of complaining. On the other
hand, repairs may just draw citizens’ attention toward problems in the public space. In this section I present
results that suggest that government work increases citizens’ participation by improving citizens’ expectations
about government responsiveness.
Not only the government intervenes in the public space. Another important actor are utility service compa-
nies that provide gas, electricity, and water. Whenever there is a problem with their service, or maintenance work
to perform more generally, companies notify the government and proceed to execute the work. The type of work
they perform many times involves opening a hole in the sidewalk (and sometimes in the street), which usually
remains open for at least a few days. In general, their employees are quite distinguishable from government
employees: they wear identifying uniforms and their vehicles have the name of the company plotted . Therefore,
their work is visible for citizens, and normally not attributed to the government. If government repairs were
driving attention to problems in the public space, it could be expected that work performed by utility service
companies would have the same effect. I use information about the location and time of interventions by
companies to test whether this is the case. Table 3.11 present the results for the main specification using the
work done by providers.
Columns (1) to (4) show the estimated effect of companies’ work in Nb on citizens’ complaints in b at
time t, separated by whether the work was announced to the government with anticipation (planned work)
or spontaneous (emergency). In all cases the point estimates are small and not significant. Column (5) to (8)
combines both types of work into one indicator for any work performed by companies, and the lack of effect
still remains. Therefore, citizens do not seem to react to interventions in the public space by service utility
service companies, which provides evidence against the hypothesis that saliency is what drives the main result.
Alternatively, repairs may convey information about the government, which in turn could affect the expected
payoff of complaining. In its simplest form, a citizen will complain if:
Value(solution) ⇤ [P(solution|complaint)  P(solution|no.complaint)]cost(complaint) (3.2)
Repairs could be taken as a signal of state capacity or of government responsiveness, both with a pos-
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itive effect on the perceived effectiveness of complaints, [P(solution|complaint)  P(solution|no.complaint)].7
Whereas state capacity is related to the execution of work in general,work that was requested by citizens is more
tightly related to government responsiveness. Therefore, in order to distinguish between these two explanations,
I separately identify the effect of repairs that come from citizens’ requests from those that come from other
sources.
Table 3.12 disaggregates the effect of repairs into these five sources: citizens’ complaints, requests by citizens’
representatives, work decided internally by the government, work requested to the government by judges
or other institutions, and government repairs related to previous work done by utility service companies. I
find that the existence of repairs addressing citizens’ requests (directly or through representatives) have the
largest impact. However, problems reported by citizens may be different from problems notified by other
sources, accounting for the differential impact. In Table 3.13 I thus focus on the number of tasks performed in
order to solve the problem, as a measure of its size and complexity. Results show that underlying differences
across problems are not driving the differential impact between repairs from different sources, at least under
this measure of their characteristics. All in all, the result found suggests that the perception of government
responsiveness may be the main explanation for an increase in citizens’ participation.
3.5 Discussion
Does government effectiveness affect citizens’ participation? I examine this question in the context of work in
the public space and citizens? complaints in the City of Buenos Aires. This context is particularly well suited to
capture changes in beliefs, since barriers to participation are relatively low and work is easily observable.
This paper gives a positive answer: when citizens observe the government working in the public space,
they are more likely to complain about other problems in the public space. A variety of tests suggest that
reverse causality or differential pre-trends do not drive this result, but an updated perception of government
responsiveness is what stimulates participation.
In developing countries, access to public goods is not only low overall, but also quite heterogeneous,
both across countries and within countries (Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan 2007). This heterogeneity and its
persistence could potentially be explained by the existence of multiple equilbria: in some areas, good provision
leads citizens to hold higher expectations about the government, which in turn stimulates political actions that
reinforce good provision; whereas in some other places, citizens’ expectation about the government are very
low, which in turn leads to low participation and hence worse outcomes. This paper contributes by providing
7In both cases, there could be a negative second order effect. If citizens perceive that state capacity is higher,
they may believe that a solution will ensue regardless of their complaints, which in turn would disincentive
their participation. Moreover, if responsiveness is perceived to be higher, citizens may prefer to free ride from
neighbors, as their participation may be believed to be enough now to obtain a solution.
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Table 3.12: Effect of Repairs, by Source of Notification
Dummy new complaints in block b at time t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy repairs Nb at t, from:
Complaints 0.0151*** 0.0139*** 0.0175*** 0.0173***
(0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0046)
Representatives 0.0254** 0.0411** 0.0418** 0.0404**
(0.0102) (0.0141) (0.0145) (0.0147)
Government officials 0.0027 0.0031 0.0026 0.0026
(0.0045) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0055)
Other institutions 0.0274 0.0208 0.0213 0.0206
(0.0202) (0.0264) (0.0261) (0.0262)
Utility service companies 0.0097 0.0079 0.0088 0.0093
(0.0092) (0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0094)
No repairs own block, t x x x x
Lag complaints repairs b, Nb x x x
Area trends linear
Neighborhood trends linear
Observations 169,757 151,231 151,231 151,201
R-squared 0.0039 0.0054 0.0067 0.0074
Number of blocks 22,221 22,221 22,221 22,217
Notes: All regressions include month and block fixed effects. "Dummy new complaints in block b at time t"
is a dummy that takes value 1 if there was a new complaint filed in block b during month t, and 0 otherwise.
"Dummy repairs Nb at t, from complaints" is a dummy that takes value 1 if there was at least one repair
in a block near block b during month t that was originated by a complaint, and 0 otherwise. Variables for
representatives, government officials, other institutions, and utility service companies are defined in the same
way. All regressions exclude blocks that are experiencing any repair at t. "Lag complaints repairs b, Nb" includes
as controls the number of repairs and complaints at t-1 for both block b and nearby blocks Nb, separately for
each source of notification. Errors are clustered at area level.
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Table 3.13: Effect of Repairs, by Source of Notification, Adjusting by Size of Problem
Dummy new complaints in block b at time t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of tasks performed Nb at t, from:
Complaints 0.0040*** 0.0039*** 0.0044*** 0.0044***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Representatives 0.0059** 0.0064** 0.0067** 0.0065**
(0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Government officials -0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Other institutions 0.0033* 0.0025 0.0025 0.0024
(0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Utility service companies 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
No repairs own block, t x x x x
Lag complaints repairs b, Nb x x x
Area trends linear
Neighborhood trends linear
Observations 169,757 151,231 151,231 151,201
R-squared 0.0040 0.0056 0.0069 0.0075
Number of blocks 22,221 22,221 22,221 22,217
Notes: All regressions include month and block fixed effects. "Dummy new complaints in block b at time t"
is a dummy that takes value 1 if there was a new complaint filed in block b during month t, and 0 otherwise.
"Number of tasks performed Nb at t, from complaints" is the number of tasks executes in blocks near block b
during month t that were originated by a complaint. Variables for representatives, government officials, other
institutions, and utility service companies are defined in the same way. All regressions exclude blocks that are
experiencing any repair at t. "Lag complaints repairs b, Nb" includes as controls the number of repairs and
complaints at t-1 for both block b and nearby blocks Nb, separately for each source of notification. Errors are
clustered at area level.
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evidence for the causal effect of quality of government on participation, which complements previous work on
the causal effect of participation on quality of government.
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